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I. INTRODUCTION: LEGAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL PROTECTIONS 
FOR FAIR USE OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS 
United States copyright law nominally grants consumers the right 
to make "fair use" of copyrighted works. I When the copyrighted work 
is distributed in digital form, however, technological impediments 
may, as a practical matter, prevent some uses of the work that the law 
would recognize as fair. Distributors of copyrighted digital works may 
deploy "digital rights management" ("DRM") mechanisms that allow 
only certain types of access to, or uses of, the underlying copyrighted 
work and forbid all others? Although technologically sophisticated 
users may be able to bypass a DRM mechanism and obtain greater 
I. Although I will follow common usage herein in speaking of fair use as a "right," it is, 
more precisely, a statutory immunity from liability for acts that would otherwise amount to 
copyright infringement. For a conception that places users' rights at the center, rather than 
the periphery, of fair use analysis, see L. RAy PATTERSON & STANLEY W. LINDBERG, THE 
NATURE OF COPYRIGHT: A LAW OF USERS' RIGHTS ch. 14 (1991). See also id. at 103-06 
(arguing that the wording of the fair use statute perversely works to enhance copyright hold-
ers' monopoly insofar as it is vague and drafted from the copyright holder's vantage point). 
The fair use doctrine is presently codified in 17 U.S.c. § 107 (2000). 
2. An accessible overview of DRM technology is available in GARTNERG2 & TI-IE 
BERKMAN CENTER FOR INTERNET & SOCIETY AT HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, COPYRIGHT AND 
DIGITAL MEDIA IN A POST-NAPSTER WORLD 43-50 (2d ed. 2005), http:// 
cyber.law.harvard.edulmedialfiles/wp2005.pdf. The umbrella term "DRM" describes a class 
of technologies, the particulars of which vary from one implementation to the next. The 
details of a few particular implementations will be taken up below. See infra notes 59-65 
and accompanying text (describing DRM mechanisms employed to protect digital music 
downloads and DVD video discs). 
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access to the work than the DRM mechanism is intended to permit/ 
such circumvention may violate the Digital Millennium Copyright 
Act of 1998 ("DMCA,,).4 DRM technology and the DMCA have been 
controversial in academic and technological circles: copyright holders 
may deploy DRM mechanisms that do not allow fair uses of the copy-
righted work and the DMCA may protect such mechanisms against 
circumvention, resulting in a curtailment of consumers' ability to en-
gage in lawful fair uses of digital copyrighted works.s 
As more and more copyrighted content is released in digital form, 
the risk of a shrinking domain for fair use has inspired some observers 
to ask whether DRM technology may evolve to preserve end user 
freedoms. On this view, DRM technology need not be inherently re-
strictive of fair use rights. Rather, limiting fair use via DRM is simply 
one choice among many alternative design decisions that DRM archi-
tects might adopt.6 Protecting fair use of digital content would simply 
involve tweaking, rather than circumventing, the DRM mechanisms 
employed to protect the underlying copyrighted work. By fostering 
instead of preventing fair use, future DRM technologies might reduce 
the present disunion between what the law permits and what technol-
ogyenables.7 
3. See Competition, Innovation, and Public Policy in the Digital Age: Is the Marketplace 
Working to Protect Digital Creative Works Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th 
Congo 2 (2002) [hereinafter Felten Testimony] (statement of Edward W. Felten, Associate 
Professor of Computer Science, Princeton University) ("[S]trong copy protection (protec-
tion that a moderately skilled person expending moderate effort cannot break) simply is not 
possible on general purpose computers ... [and] is as implausible to many experts as a 
perpetual motion machine."), available at http://www.freedom-to-tinker.com/felten_ 
testimony.pdf. 
4. Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2360 (1998) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.c. 
§§ 1201-1205). For a summary of the key events leading to the passage of the DMCA, see 
WILLIAM W. FISHER 111, PROMISES TO KEEP: TECHNOLOGY, LAW, AND THE FUTURE OF 
ENTERTAINMENT 90-93 (2004); JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 122-45 (2001). See 
generally infra Part II.B.2. 
5. See, e.g., David Nimmer, A Riff on Fair Use in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 
148 U. PA. L. REv. 673, 739-40 (2000); Matt Jackson, Using Technology to Circumvent the 
Law: The DMCA's Push 10 Privatize Copyright, 23 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 607, 638 
(2001) (arguing that the DMCA "threatens precisely these legitimate [fair] uses of copy-
righted texts"); ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES: FIVE 
YEARS UNDER THE DMCA 7-9 (2003), http://www.eff.orglIP/DMCAIunintended_ 
consequences.pdf. 
6. See Stefan Bechtold, The Present and Future of Digital Rights Management- Mus-
ings on Emerging Legal Problems, in DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT - TECHNOLOGICAL, 
ECONOMIC, LEGAL AND POLITICAL ASPECTS, LNCS 2770, at 597, 603 (Eberhard Becker et 
al. eds., 2003) (noting that nothing inherent in DRM technology makes it impossible to 
design DRM systems that are more accommodating of end user rights than most contempo-
rary DRM implementations). 
7. On the range of choices available to future designers of DRM technologies, see, for 
example, Stefan Bechtold, Value-Centered Design of Digital Rights Management: Perspec-
tives on an Emerging Scholarship, INDICARE MONITOR, Sept. 9, 2004, 
http://www . indicare.orgltiki-read _ artic Ie. php ?artic Ie Id~ 3 9. 
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The conventional wisdom is justifiably skeptical of the notion that 
copyright's fair use doctrine, which legally depends upon balancing a 
number of highly malleable contextual factors,8 might ever be reduced 
to something that can be administered by machine. The balancing test 
established in the fair use statute does not specify the substance of the 
factors that must be considered or the relative weights that should be 
given to each, and the very nature of some of the factors is such that 
they cannot readily be reduced to binary logic. For these reasons, 
some computer scientists argue that a computer cannot be pro-
grammed to accurately reproduce the decisions that a human judge 
would render in an individual case, and therefore cannot effectively 
substitute for human decisionmaking in administering the fair use 
doctrine.9 A recent government report summarizes the conventional 
view: 
The copyright law, although carefully worded, sim-
ply cannot be expressed in the kind of algorithmic 
language that is required by computer programs to 
automate functionality like printing or copying. This 
is especially true of the key concept of "fair use." 
Fair use is a deliberately vague exception to the mo-
nopoly rights of the copyright holder. It says essen-
tially that although the copyright holder has the 
exclusive right to make copies of the work, members 
of the public can also make copies if their use is 
"fair." There is no a priori test for whether a use is 
fair; each such exercise of the public's right must be 
carefully scrutinized taking into account a number of 
factors. Even after such scrutiny, not everyone will 
agree on what is fair. Electronic systems need an un-
ambiguous and quantitative definition that they can 
act on, and the copyright law does not provide that. 10 
Other recent scholarship, however, suggests that this received or-
thodoxy may be ripe for re-examination. Efforts to provide techno-
logical protection for fair use rights have evolved in unexpected 
8. See infra notes 30-31. 
9. See Edward W. Felten, A Skeptical View of DRM and Fair Use, COMM. ACM, Apr. 
2003, at 56. 
10. KAREN COYLE, RIGHTS EXPRESSION LANGUAGES: A REPORT FOR THE LIBRARY OF 
CONGRESS II (Feb. 2004), http://www.loc.gov/standards/Coylereport_finallsingle.pdf; see 
also WILLIAM ROSENBLATT ET AL., DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT: BUSINESS AND TECH-
NOLOGY 45 (2002); David Nimmer, "Fairest of Them All" and Other Fairy Tales of Fair 
Use, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 263, 284 (2003) ("[I]t seems unlikely that anyone will 
develop a heuristic device for computer programs to calculate when fair use should apply-
at least, any time before machines become human."); infra notes 101-05. 
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directions, II and legal scholars have pushed to identify with particu-
larity what practical hurdles must be overcome for fair use to receive 
h I . I . 12 tec no oglca protectlon. 
The driving insight of these new approaches is a de-emphasis on 
the substance of copyright law and a new stress on process. We can-
not have a "judge on a chip" - an electronic system that balances the 
statutory factors (and whatever nonstatutory factors a human judge 
would consider) and unerringly produces the same decision that a 
human judge would render in any individual case. But is such a 
"judge on a chip" indispensable to protecting fair use of digital con-
tent? Outside the digital arena, fair uses of copyrighted works are not 
subject to DRM-like prior review, permission, or restraint by copy-
right holders or their designees. Taking user experiences with copy-
righted works in the offline world as our baseline, we might set the 
goal of creating similar opportunities for fair use of digital works. 13 
As one observer put it, when it comes to designing technological pro-
tections for fair use, it is 
clear that many DRM vendors are asking precisely 
the wrong question. The approach should not be "tell 
me what fair use requires, and I'll build it in" but 
rather "how can I build something that permits a va-
riety of as-yet unknown uses, so that courts can de-
cide whether those future uses are fair.,,14 
Creating systems that unlock the process of fair use, while still pro-
viding copyright owners with technological protections against in-
fringement, is a challenge that requires neither creating a '~udge on a 
chip" nor jettisoning the legitimate protections that DRM measures 
provide. 
Authors have offered a variety of proposals aimed at incorporat-
ing protections for fair use into DRM technologies. These have ranged 
from the simplistic (hard-coding an agreed subset of clearly fair uses 
into a user's copy ofDRM-protected content) I 5 to the highly sophisti-
cated (combining preauthorized fair use defaults with an interactive 
remote authorization mechanism to acquire additional permissions).16 
At bottom, however, virtually all these proposals suffer from a com-
II. See infra Part IV.A.3. 
12. See infra Part IV.A.2. 
13. Throughout this Article, I will use the term the "offline world" to refer to copyrighted 
works that are not protected by DRM, even though DRM protections can be used in digital 
works that do not appear on the Internet or any network. This term merely seeks to contrast 
past conventional fair use experiences with experiences using works protected by DRM. 
14. FRED VON LOHMANN, RECONCILING DRM AND FAIR USE: PRESERVING FUTURE FAIR 
USES? I (2002), http://www.cfp2002.orglfairusellohmann.pdf. 
15. See infra notes 95-97 and accompanying text. 
16. See infra notes 142-52 and accompanying text. 
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mon flaw: although they may employ very sophisticated authorization 
models that permit a variety of interactions and responses between 
users and content providers, each of the proposals creates a burden of 
obtaining consent that has no parallel in the offline world. Stated 
slightly differently, every permissions-based DRM implementation (in 
which the user must formally acquire some form of explicit authoriza-
tion to engage in a particular use of the protected work) simply repro-
duces a variant of the "judge on a chip" problem. No such system can 
ever replicate the experience of fair use in the offline world because 
the requirement of ex ante authorization by the copyright holder or its 
designee is a departure from offline practice and statutory require-
ments. 17 
Recent academic work suggests a new direction for protecting fair 
use in the digital arena. Authors looking at the issue from both legal 
and technological standpoints have begun to outline a new framework 
that would allow end users greater latitude to make fair uses of digital 
content. For example, future DRM implementations might include a 
new messaging layer that would allow authorizations to be communi-
cated from multiple sources, potentially even from users themselves. ls 
One such proposed DRM system, aimed expressly at preserving end 
users' fair use rights, has been developed by a team of academic and 
industry computer scientists from the Netherlands. Their proposal 
expands upon traditional DRM systems by allowing end users to as-
sert new rights not previously granted by the content provider, while 
protecting the copyright holder against abuse by logging each such 
assertion for subsequent review. 19 
The remainder of this Article explores the development of DRM 
technologies aimed at preserving practical opportunities for fair use of 
digital content. Part II begins with an examination of copyright law, 
the historical uses of DRM technologies, and accompanying statutory 
protections against circumvention of DRM. The historical overview is 
intended to establish a policy baseline for evaluating existing and pro-
posed protections for fair use in the context of digital media. I contend 
that a system of digital media regulation that accepts, as a baseline, 
the reasonable expectations of fair use that users have derived over a 
lifetime of interactions with ordinary offline media is preferable to a 
system that frustrates these expectations.z° One's inclination to accept, 
17. See infra note 178 and accompanying text. 
18. See infra Parts IV.A.I, IV.A.2. 
19. See infra Part IV.A.3. 
20. This approach is admittedly conservative. The ever-expanding pool of media content 
available in digital form, coupled with the widespread availability of sophisticated authoring 
tools even on entry-level computer hardware, collectively blurs distinctions between pro-
ducers and consumers and invites the formulation of new approaches to fair use that better 
capture the many types of creative interactions users may experience with digital media. 
See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, From Consumers to Users: Shifting the Deeper Structures of 
Regulation Toward Sustainable Commons and User Access, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 561 
HeinOnline -- 20 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 55 2006-2007
No.1] Digital Rights Management and the Process of Fair Use 55 
or to dispute, my position should prove a reliable guide to the reader's 
. h' d f 21 receptiveness to t e remam er 0 my argument. 
Part III continues with a comparative assessment of a variety of 
existing and proposed DRM systems, describing how each system 
provides, or fails to provide, robust protections for fair use. I will de-
velop two critical observations in this portion of the Article. First, the 
efficacy of any DRM system for protecting fair use depends in large 
measure on the extent to which the system grants parties other than 
the copyright holder - such as the government, a third party licens-
ing authority, or the end user - a say in whether any individual use, 
or category of uses, will be permitted. Existing DRM technologies 
offer poor protections for fair use because the determination of which 
uses are permitted is largely at the discretion of copyright holders or 
their designees. Second, protections for fair use in any DRM system 
are partly a function of the particular language the designers of that 
system employ to express digital rights information. Although the 
most widespread DRM implementations available today adopt a 
"closed-universe" approach in which any right not described by the 
system is deemed not to exist, proposed alternative systems would 
establish different default behaviors that may better accommodate fair 
use rights. 
Part IV examines recent DRM proposals that would incorporate 
varying levels of input from end users into the process of unlocking 
and accessing the underlying copyrighted works and describes a sys-
tem that would provide protections for consumers of digital content 
comparable to those in the offline arena. The emphasis here is on 
solving the 'judge on a chip" problem by allowing the scope of ma-
chine-recognized user "permissions" to expand dynamically in re-
(2000). The literature has already begun to grapple with the implications for DRM design of 
a universe in which all consumers are simultaneously potential creators whose rights in their 
own creations must receive protection comparable to other copyright holders' rights. See, 
e.g., Akiko Seki & Wataru Kameyama, A Proposal on Open DRM System Coping with Both 
Benefits of Rights-Holders and Users, in IEEE GLOBAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
CONFERENCE: COMMUNICATIONS, GLOBECOM 2003, at 4111 (2003); infra note 126. 
My aim here is not to freeze the legal or policy analysis of fair use to what exists pres-
ently in the offline world, but rather to use the offline policy baseline to illuminate the ways 
that DRM currently protects (or fails to protect) fair use. Indeed, the ultimate benefit of a 
DRM system engineered to protect fair use as a process, rather than attempting to hard-code 
the substantive law of fair use, would be the liberation of fair use doctrine so that it can 
continue to evolve on a case-by-case basis in response to users' actions. 
Although I have spoken of the beneficiaries of the fair use doctrine as both "consumers" 
and "users," I will use the latter formulation in the remainder of this Article - an etymo-
logical choice that on the one hand adheres to convention, but on the other carries unavoid-
able normative significance. See Julie E. Cohen, The Place of the User in Copyright Law, 74 
FORDHAM L. REV. 347 (2005). 
21. For a contrary view that DRM restrictions imposed by the copyright holder not only 
can, but should, trump individual expectations regarding fair use in the digital domain, see 
Ben Fernandez, Note, Content Protection and Fair Use: What's the Use?, 3 J. ON 
TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 425 (2005). 
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sponse to a user's assertion of fair use rights without ex ante involve-
ment of the copyright holder. The three most prominent components 
of the system developed in this part of the article, all of which are 
drawn from prior technical literature on DRM, are (I) a user rights 
assertion framework whereby users may acquire the power to access 
or use the protected work in any fashion they wish without the neces-
sity of prior approval by an outside decisionmaker; (2) an audit log-
ging mechanism that preserves information about such rights 
assertions; and (3) an identity escrow framework employing crypto-
graphic techniques to shield the identity of users (except upon a 
proper showing of cause). Part V considers a number of legal and po-
litical issues connected with the implementation of fair use protections 
in DRM mechanisms. Finally, Part VI concludes that DRM mecha-
nisms engineered to protect fair use rights are in the long-term inter-
ests of both content providers and consumers.22 
II. COPYRIGHT LA W AND/OR DIGITAL RIGHTS 
MANAGEMENT23 
A. Traditional Copyright: The Normative Baseline 
From the moment a creative work24 is fixed in a tangible medium 
of expression,25 the creator of the work enjoys statutorily enumerated 
exclusive rights, including the rights to make and distribute copies of 
the work, to perform the work publicly, and to prepare derivative 
works.26 Because the copyright statute aims to protect users as well as 
copyright holders,27 the copyright holder enjoys its exclusive rights 
22. In these sections, and throughout this article, I will assume that the fair use issue re-
mains relevant in any particular case - that is to say, that the user of DRM-protected con-
tent actually enjoys the right to engage in fair uses of the underlying work and has not, for 
example, voluntarily relinquished that right by contract. Cf Dennis S. Karjala, Federal 
Preemption of Shrinkwrap and On-Line Licenses, 22 U. DAYTON L. REV. 511, 525-33 
(1997) (arguing that non-negotiated waiver of fair use rights, such as under a shrinkwrap 
license, should be deemed preempted by the Copyright Act); Lydia Pallas Loren, Slaying 
the Leather-Winged Demons in the Night: Reforming Copyright Owner Contracting with 
Clickwrap Misuse, 30 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 495, 512-35 (2004) (arguing that contractual 
clauses requiring waiver of end user copyright rights should be presumed invalid on grounds 
of copyright misuse, although the presumption could be rebutted by the copyright holder). 
23. For the inspiration behind the title of this Part, see Pamela Samuelson, DRM {and, or, 
vs.} the Lmv, COMM. ACM, Apr. 2003, at 41. 
24. See Feist Publ'ns,lnc. v. Rural Tel. Servo Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991) (explaining 
that "at least some minimal degree of creativity" is a prerequisite to copyrightability). 
25. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000). 
26. ld. § 106. 
27. The notion of a balance between the interests of copyright holders on the one hand, 
and users of creative works on the other, recurs frequently in copyright discourse. The Su-
preme Court has consistently described copyright not only as a monopoly grant to creators, 
but also as a quid pro quo aimed at ensuring both protections for creators and public access 
to creative works. As the Court put it: 
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subject to a number of enumerated exceptions?8 First among these is 
the exception for fair use of copyrighted works.29 
Unlike many of the other limitations upon copyright holders' ex-
clusive rights, the fair use exception is not limited to particular cate-
gories of works or users. Indeed, the exception is conspicuously open-
ended in at least two respects. First, it specifies illustrative categories 
of uses that will be deemed "fair," rather than enumerating specific 
facts that must be present to claim the exception.30 Second, the statute 
aims to guide, instead of limit, the exercise of judicial discretion by 
enumerating four non-exclusive factors that courts should consider in 
resolving any proffered fair use defense?' 
Whole books have been written on the subject of fair use,32 and it 
is not my aim herein to provide more than a broad outline of the doc-
trine. Certain features common to fair uses in general, however, are 
particularly salient to a consideration of fair use in the digital domain. 
First, fair uses are unauthorized by the copyright holder. That is 
to say, the would-be fair user of copyrighted material need not obtain 
the copyright holder's approval to do so; to the contrary, fair uses are 
The limited scope of the copyright holder's statutory monopoly, like 
the limited copyright duration required by the Constitution, reflects a 
balance of competing claims upon the public interest: Creative work 
is to be encouraged and rewarded, but private motivation must ulti-
mately serve the cause of promoting broad public availability of lit-
erature, music, and the other arts. 
Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (footnotes omitted). 
28. See 17 U.S.c. §§ 107-122 (2000). 
29. !d. § 107. 
30.!d. (referring to permissibility of copying "for purposes such as criticism, comment, 
news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or 
research"). 
31. Id. Courts must consider: 
(I) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such 
use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational pur-
poses; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and 
substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted 
work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential 
market for or value of the copyrighted work. 
Id. In construing this provision, the Supreme Court has cautioned that the fair use inquiry "is 
not to be simplified with bright-line rules, for the statute, like the doctrine it recognizes, 
calls for case-by-case analysis .... [The factors] provide only general guidance about the 
sorts of copying that courts and Congress most commonly had found to be fair uses." 
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577-78 (1994). Commentators have 
suggested that the statute by its terms authorizes the courts to consider the inherent equity of 
any given use - to reason, in other words, that its innate "fairness" or "unfairness" may 
authorize, or forbid, a use irrespective of precisely how the enumerated statutory factors are 
balanced. See Lloyd L. Weinreb, Fair's Fair: A Comment on the Fair Use Doctrine, 103 
HARV. L. REv. 1137, 1150 (1990) ("Fair use does not exclude consideration of factors not 
related to the utilitarian justification for copyright - other social values or, more simply, 
fairness."). Certainly the reported cases on fair use do not appear to be dictated solely by 
consideration of the four statutory factors. See Nimmer, supra note 10, at 267. 
32. See, e.g., WILLIAM F. PATRY, THE FAIR USE PRIVILEGE IN COPYRIGHT LAW (2d ed. 
1995); FAIR USE AND FREE INQUIRY: COPYRIGHT LAW AND THE NEW MEDIA (John Shelton 
Lawrence & Bernard Ti mberg eds., 1989). 
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lawful even where permission has been sought and denied.33 As a pol-
icy matter, the protection of fair use is likely to be most necessary 
where, as with the vulgar parody in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music,34 
the copyright holder withholds permission in the face of criticism or 
parody, no matter what licensing fee a user might offer. By protecting 
such uses irrespective of the copyright holder's wishes, the fair use 
doctrine contributes to the creation of works that would not exist if the 
copyright holder's denial of permission were dispositive. 
Second, fair uses do not require compensation to the copyright 
holder. Just as the copyright holder is not empowered to authorize or 
reject a fair use, so too is the user excused from any requirement to 
pay the copyright holder in order to exercise fair use rights. One could 
imagine a system in which any user could make any use of any work 
they wished so long as that user paid a compulsory royalty to the 
copyright holder.35 The fair use doctrine does not establish such a sys-
tem, but rather withdraws from copyright holders the right to insist 
upon compensation for fair uses.36 
Third, and perhaps in consequence of the two features already 
named, most offline fair uses are effectively anonymous. Because the 
user need not alert the copyright holder to the use, either to obtain 
permission or to arrange for payment, most users will not alert the 
copyright holder at all when making a use they believe is fair. Al-
33. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 572-73. 
34./d. 
35. See, e.g., 17 U.S.c. § liS (2000) (establishing compulsory licensing scheme allowing 
any person, upon payment of a statutory royalty, to make a recording of a nondramatic 
musical work that has previously been recorded, so long as "the basic melody or fundamen-
tal character of the work" is not changed). 
36. C/ Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic 
Analysis of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1614-15 
(1982) (arguing that breakdown in the market for licensing uses of the copyrighted work is a 
factor that would-be fair users ought to be required to demonstrate to take advantage of the 
fair use doctrine). Limiting fair use to circumstances where market approaches fail, how-
ever, cedes to copyright holders the sole authority to define (by refusing to offer a license) 
which uses are fair - a greater measure of control than the fair use doctrine actually pro-
vides. For that reason, it seems preferable to characterize the fair use doctrine as withdraw-
ing a subset of possible uses from the domain of licensing altogether, instead of limiting fair 
use to those circumstances where the copyright holder elects not to offer a license. 
This approach finds support in case law, particularly in the recognition by some courts 
that the fourth statutory fair use factor is susceptible to manipulation by copyright holders 
who may try to create the appearance of adverse market effects by offering to license their 
works for uses that would otherwise be recognized as fair. Although some courts have 
shown sensitivity to the risk that these tactical licensing decisions may curtail fair uses by 
magnifying the appearance of forgone licensing revenues, others have apparently allowed 
such artificially created market effects to weigh against a finding of fair use. Compare Bill 
Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 FJd 60S, 614-15 (2d Cir. 2006) (caution-
ing against giving dispositive weight in assessment of market effects to copyright holder's 
licensing decisions) with Perfect 10 v. Google, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 2d 828, 832, 851 (C.D. 
Cal. 2006) (rejecting fair use defense when plaintiff had licensed its own works for trans-
formative purposes after commencement of litigation and alleged fair use would harm po-
tential market for these licensed works). 
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though copyright holders may nevertheless come to learn of the use, 
particularly where the use is highly public or involves large-scale 
copying,37 as a practical matter, fair uses tend to occur "under the ra-
dar" of copyright holders and are essentially anonymous. 
The fair use doctrine as it exists in traditional copyright law, ac-
cordingly, protects users' rights to make unauthorized, uncompen-
sated, and effectively anonymous copies of a copyrighted work for 
purposes such as those given in the statute.38 As will be discussed in 
this Article, much of the difficulty with implementing the fair use 
doctrine in the digital domain revolves around the problematic repre-
sentation of these features of traditional fair use law through DRM. 
These contours of traditional copyright law provide a baseline of 
common user experiences with copyrighted works against which 
DRM systems may be compared. The fair use doctrine imparts to us-
ers a reasonable belief that they may engage, without fear of liability, 
in uses of copyrighted content of the sort that have been found to be 
fair. The evolution of DRM, however, demonstrates how technologi-
cal and legal measures have combined to frustrate these settled user 
. 39 
expectations. 
B. Contemporary Copyright: DRM as a "Speedbump" 
to Slow Mass Infringement40 
In the 1990s, the combination of advancing compression tech-
nologies, wide availability of desired entertainment products in easily 
reproducible digital form, increasing computer power and storage ca-
pacity, and growing access to the Internet at broadband speeds formed 
37. See, e.g., Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 1384 
(6th Cir. (996) (en banc); Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522, 
1526 (S.D.N.Y. (991). 
38. A separate characteristic might be ascribed to many fair uses: because advance per-
mission need not be sought and compensation need not be paid, users may make spontane-
ous fair uses of a copyrighted work. Preserving spontaneous fair use involves a technical 
challenge for DRM systems. Fair use protection, however, applies irrespective of spontane-
ity - that is to say, the doctrine remains equally applicable even if it is necessary, for ex-
ample, to retrieve the work from a remote library before it may be used. Spontaneity, 
therefore, is merely one consequence of the rule that the copyright owner's permission is not 
required for fair use. The doctrine permits fair use even where there would be adequate time 
to secure the copyright holder's permission were the parties inclined to negotiate. 
39. See Deirdre Mulligan & Aaron Burstein, Implementing Copyright Limitations in 
Rights Expression Languages, in DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT: ACM CCS-9 
WORKSHOP, DRM 2002, LNCS 2696, at 137, 139 (Joan Feigenbaum ed., 2003), available 
at http://www.law.berkeley.edu/ci inics/samuelson/projects _papers/2002f_ drm _ acm_ 
paper.pdf ("Machine-enforced use restrictions ... frequently defy the 'real space norms' 
that have developed around the use of copyrighted works."); see also infra notes 175-78 
and accompanying text. 
40. See generally Digital Media Project, Berkman Center for Internet & Society at Har-
vard Law School, Speedbumps Scenario for Digital Media, http://cyber.law.harvard.edul 
medialscenari02 (last visited Nov. 16,2006). 
HeinOnline -- 20 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 60 2006-2007
60 Harvard Journal of Law & Technology [Vol. 20 
a "perfect storm.,,41 It supplied the conditions for a fundamental unset-
tling of the incumbent balance between end users' ability to redistrib-
ute copyrighted content and copyright holders' ability to limit such 
redistribution.42 These changes created a crisis of confidence for digi-
tal media copyright holders. Their response was twofold. First, they 
deployed technological protection measures, including rudimentary 
encryption systems, to control access to authorized media. These 
measures, however, were recognized from the outset to be vulnerable 
to circumvention by sophisticated users, who might circulate copies of 
the content from which the DRM mechanisms had been stripped. Ac-
cordingly, copyright holders took the second step of seeking special 
legal protections for DRM mechanisms. The World Intellectual Prop-
erty Organization ("WIPO") adopted treaties that mandated stronger 
statutory protections for DRM in signatory nations,43 and Congress 
responded by enacting the DMCA.44 
1. Digital Rights Management 
Federal law provides heavy penalties for copyright infringe-
ment.45 The fear of liability, of course, suffices to deter at least some 
would-be infringers. DRM technologies attempt to go one step further 
by making copyright infringement impractical or costly.46 DRM, 
properly deployed, provides a second level of deterrence that prevents 
at least some violations committed by users not adequately deterred 
by the fear of legal liability. What makes DRM controversial is its 
potential to overdeter - to prevent lawful, noninfringing uses of pro-
tected content.47 
41. See, e.g., Richard Owens & Rajen Akalu, Legal Policy and Digital Rights Manage-
ment, 92 PROC. IEEE 997, 997 (2004) ("Duplication of content has, thus, become easy, 
cheap, and perfect. Acquisition of duplicated content has become nearly instantaneous and 
free."); FISHER, supra note 4, ch. 3. 
42. See, e.g., Owens & Akalu, supra note 41, at 997; FISHER, supra note 4, ch. 3. 
43. World Intellectual Property Organization, WIPO Copyright Treaty art. II, Dec. 20, 
1996, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-17, at I (1997), 36 I.L.M. 65, available at http:// 
www.wipo.intitreaties/en/ip/wctltrtdocs_wo033.html[hereinafter WI PO Copyright Treaty]; 
World Intellectual Property Organization, WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty art. 
18, Dec. 20, 1996, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-17, at 18 (1997), 36 I.L.M. 76, available at 
http://www.wipo.intitreaties/enlip/wpptltrtdocs_wo034.html[hereinafter WIPO Perform-
ances and Phonograms Treaty]. 
44. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
45. See 17 U.S.c. § 501 (2000 & Supp. 2002). Civil remedies include statutory damages 
of up to $30,000 per infringing act, which increase to $150,000 if the infringement is found 
to be willful. ld. § 504(c). Criminal penalties are available where the infringer profited, 
where the total retail value of the infringed works exceeded $1,000, or where the infringer 
leaked a pre-release copy ofa copyrighted work on the Internet.ld. § 506(a). 
46. For a more sophisticated assessment of the behavioral incentives underlying the 
adoption of DRM technologies and the use of DRM-protected products, see John A. Roth-
child, Economic Analysis of Technological Protection Measures, 84 OR. L. REV. 489 
(2005). 
47. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
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The technological debate over DRM revolves around the issue of 
efficacy.48 The present situation is difficult to define except in broad 
generalizations. Copyright holders' deployment of DRM technologies 
sparked an ongoing "arms race" of sorts, with each successive techno-
logical advance on one side being met by a response on the other.49 
That race continues. Of technological measures deployed to protect 
digital music, (1) attempts to embed protection measures in Compact 
Discs ("CDs") generally have a poor record of success, and (2) efforts 
to protect digital music files on the Internet against copying and unau-
thorized use have succeeded in the market in inverse proportion to the 
burden they place on users. 
There have been many failed attempts to embed protection tech-
nologies into CDs. The most recent, and highly public, failure arose 
from an ill-considered attempt by Sony to embed DRM technologies 
in audio CDs. The DRM software Sony deployed shared a number of 
pernicious characteristics with so-called "spyware" and "rootkit" pro-
grams.50 Sony CDs even damaged a number of users' computers, 
leaving them vulnerable to attack by malicious third-party software, 
before the company executed a public-relations about-face and of-
fered to replace the affected CDS.51 
Even before the Sony "rootkit DRM" fiasco, efforts to include 
DRM systems in audio CDs had failed repeatedly. The design of au-
dio CD technology, which antedates widespread industry concern 
with copy protection, has been a significant factor in limiting the ef-
fective deployment of DRM systems. The "Red Book" technical stan-
dards for audio CDs lack any provision allowing for encryption of the 
48. See, e.g., Fred von Lohmann, Measuring the Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
Against the Darknet: Implications for the Regulation of Technological Protection Measures, 
24 Loy. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 635, 640-41 (2004) (arguing that technological measures to date 
have proven ineffective at preventing mass copying and distribution of DRM-protected 
works); Felten Testimony, supra note 3, at 2. 
49. One dedicated Norwegian programmer, Jon ("DVD Jon") Johansen, has compiled a 
resume that virtually encapsulates the major milestones in the battle between pro- and anti-
DRM forces. As a teenager, Johansen co-wrote the "DeCSS" program that allowed users to 
decrypt the contents of encrypted DVD Video discs even if they had not paid a licensing fee 
for a lawful decryption key. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 437 
(2d Cir. 2001). More recently, Johansen has written software to bypass the DRM protection 
of songs offered for sale on Apple Computer's iTunes Store - and rewritten it in response 
to Apple's efforts to bypass Johansen's software. See Wikipedia, Jon Lech Johansen, http:// 
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jon_Lech_Johansen (as of Nov. 16,2006,21 :28 GMT). Johansen has 
also registered the Internet domain name "DeAACS.com" as he plans to work on a program 
to bypass the protections of the Advanced Access Content System for next-generation 
DVDs. Dan Bell, Jon Lech Johansen Creator of DeCSS Registers DeAACS Domain (Jan. 
15,2006), http://www.cdfreaks.com/news/12948;seealsoinfranote 67. 
50. See Lorraine Woellert, Sony BMG Ends a Legal Nightmare, Bus. WK. ONLINE, Dec. 
20, 2005, http://www.businessweek.com/technology/contentldec2005/tc20051230_ 
658336.htm. 
51. See id; J. Alex Halderman & Edward W. Felten, Lessons from the Sony CD DRM 
Episode: Extended Version (Feb. 14, 2006), http://itpolicy.princeton.eduipub/sonydrrn-
ext.pdf. 
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disc's audio content.52 Because copyrighted content is released on 
audio CDs in unprotected form, it has been particularly susceptible to 
the development of technologies that facilitate digital copying.53 Ef-
forts to alter the audio CD format to incorporate copy protections, 
however, have met with resistance on a number of fronts. First, con-
sumers have balked due to the incompatibility of copy-protected CDs 
with existing player hardware - an incompatibility that in some cases 
actually damaged consumers' equipment.54 Second, the licensor of the 
official Compact Disc specification has refused to allow nonconform-
ing discs to bear the trademarked "Compact Disc" logo.55 Finally, 
Congress has considered truth-in-advertising legislation that would 
require prominent warning labels on the packaging of copy-protected 
audio CDs. 56 
The most ambitious effort to develop new copy-protection tech-
nologies for digital audio ended in a highly publicized meltdown. The 
proponents of the Secure Digital Music Initiative ("SDMI") offered a 
$10,000 prize to anyone who could "break" the digital watermarking 
technology they had developed - a task that was accomplished in 
approximately three weeks by a team of researchers led by Princeton 
University computer scientist Edward Felten.57 Felten's team rejected 
the proffered cash reward and elected instead to publish the results of 
their research, although not before fending off a threatened lawsuit 
from SDMI and its affiliates.58 
Where DRM technology has been implemented to protect digital 
audio recordings, its success in the marketplace has varied depending 
on its impact on users. Attempts by the music industry to fill the post-
Napster void to make digital music available have employed, for the 
most part, highly restrictive DRM protections. For example, Music-
Net, an early joint venture between recording industry participants 
Bertelsmann, EMI, and Time Warner, initially prohibited users from 
actually downloading songs to the user's hard drive.59 Instead, in ex-
52. See Wikipedia, Compact Disc, http://en.wikipedia.orglwiki/Compact_disc (as of Nov. 
16, 2006, 21 :38 GMT). 
53. See FISHER, supra note 4, at 83. 
54. See Dion 's CD Can Crash PCs, BBC NEWS, Apr. 5, 2002, http://news.bbc.co.ukl2/hi/ 
entertainmentlI912466.stm; Barry Willis, Copy-Protected CDs a Nightmare for BMG Ger-
many, STEREOPHILE, Feb. 6, 2000, http://www.stereophile.com/news/10671/ 
index.htm!. 
55. See Wikipedia, Compact Disc, supra note 52. 
56. See Digital Media Consumers' Rights Act of2005, H.R. 1201, 109th Congo (1st Sess. 
2005), available at http://www.boucher.house.gov/images/stories/Documents/copy _ bill_ 
1201.pdf. 
57. See Scott A. Craver et aI., Reading Between the Lines: Lessons from the SDMI Chal-
lenge (200 I ), http://www .usenix.org/pubJications/library/proceedings/secO I /craver. pdf 
(published results of Felten's research); FISHER, supra note 4, at 89, 96-97. 
58. See FISHER, supra note 4, at 96-97. 
59. See Michael Bertin, After Napster, AUSTIN CHRON., Aug. 17,2001, at 56, available 
at http://www.austinchronic1e.com/issues/dispatchl2001-08-17/musicJeature.html; Reggie 
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change for a monthly subscription fee, users were allowed to stream a 
given number of songs from the participants' catalogs; this essentially 
required users to listen to the songs at their computer, rather than al-
lowing them to transfer the songs to a portable player or bum them to 
an audio CD.60 
In contrast, Apple Computer's iTunes Music Store ("iTMS"),61 
launched with great fanfare in 2003, became notable in part because 
of the relatively permissive terms enforced by its DRM software.62 
The iTMS became a major success with users, capturing seventy per-
cent of the U.S. market for authorized online music just a year after its 
debut.63 The iTMS employs DRM software known as "FairPlay" to 
limit redistribution and copying of content downloaded from iTMS.64 
The success of iTMS supports the assertion that online digital audio 
providers succeed in the market in inverse proportion to the level of 
protective restrictions they place on users. 
Technological protection measures for video content such as fea-
ture films have arguably fared better. The combination of region cod-
ing and a rudimentary encryption scheme for DVD Video discs is 
ubiquitous today, even though the technology proved from the outset 
to be easily circumvented.65 DRM mechanisms remain highly relevant 
Beehner, Web Music Gets Legal (and Less Flexible), PC WORLD, May 17, 2001, 
http://www.pcworld.cominews/article/0.aid.50344.00.asp. 
60. See Bertin, supra note 59; Beehner, supra note 59. Other services charge extra for the 
ability to burn a song to a CD. See, e.g., Rhapsody: FAQs & Help, http://www.listen.com/ 
faq.jsp (last visited Nov. 16, 2006). 
61. Apple Computer changed the name from iTunes Music Store to iTunes Store on Sep-
tember 12, 2006. See Wikipedia, iTunes Store, http://en.wikipedia.orglwiki/ITunes_Store 
(as of Nov. 16,2006,22:01 GMT). 
62. See Wikipedia, FairPlay, http://en.wikipedia.orglwiki/FairPlay (as of Nov. 16,2006, 
22:02 GMT). FairPlay does have certain constraints, however, such as the limitation that the 
only portable digital music player on which music purchased from iTMS can be played is 
the Apple iPod. See id. 
63. See Darren Waters, Europe Launch for Apple's iTunes, BBC NEWS, June 15, 2004, 
http://news.bbc.co.ukl2Ihi/entertainmentl3805565.stm. 
64. See Wikipedia, FairPlay, supra note 62. For an examination of the crucial role DRM 
technology plays in enabling Apple's iTMS business model, see Digital Media Project, The 
Berkman Center for Internet & Society at Harvard Law School, iTunes: How Copyright, 
Contract, and Technology Shape the Business of Digital Media - A Case Study, 40-48 
(2004), htlp:llcyber.law.harvard.edulmedialitunes. 
65. The "Content Scramble System" ("CSS") encrypts the audiovisual content of a DVD 
disc using a rudimentary forty-bit stream cipher, which is much weaker than the type of 
encryption commonly used, for example, to protect online financial transactions. See An-
anda Gupta, The DeCSS Mess: A Study in Unintended Consequences (Aug. 31, 2000), 
http://www.cei.orgigencon/016,01836.cfm; Jeffrey A. Bloom et aI., Copy Protection for 
DVD Video, 87 PROC. IEEE 1267 (1999). Because of the apparent vulnerability of the CSS 
algorithm, experts question "[w]hether CSS is a serious cryptographic cipher." Frank A. 
Stevenson, Cryptanalysis of Contents Scrambling System (Nov. 8, 1999), 
http://www.cs.cmu.edul-dstiDeCSS/FrankStevensonianalysis.html. Indeed, CSS was bro-
ken by a teenaged computer programmer in 1999, and the de-scrambling code was posted 
online in the form of a program called "DeCSS." See supra note 49. Nevertheless, the CSS 
DRM mechanism, together with a region coding scheme that nominally limits DVDs to 
playback in certain countries or regions of the globe, has remained an integral part of au-
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and topical in the digital video context, with applications as varied as 
digital television broadcasting66 and high-definition video discs.67 
Indeed, concern over copyright infringement in video works has led to 
the introduction of legislation mandating the inclusion of specified 
DRM technologies in any device capable of converting between ana-
log and digital video formats - an effort to plug what has become 
known as the "analog hole.,,68 
Because of the risk that, once a DRM system has been "broken," 
the underlying content may be broadly circulated in unprotected form, 
some observers have concluded that DRM is a futile endeavor.69 Al-
though some have suggested that the problem may be avoided by de-
signing break once, break everywhere ("BOBE")-resistant DRM 
systems,70 others have expressed doubt whether such systems can ever 
be made practical.71 
thorized DVD releases to the present. See Wikipedia, DVD, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dvd (as of Nov. 16,2006,22:09 GMT). 
66. In American Library Ass 'n v. FCC, 406 F.3d 689 (D.C. Cir. 2005), the Court of Ap-
peals struck down an FCC regulation that would have outlawed the domestic sale of digital 
television receiver hardware that did not include a particular DRM scheme - the so-called 
"broadcast flag" - designed to prevent unauthorized duplication of digital video content. 
For an overview of the implications of the decision, see Cuong Lam Nguyen, A Postmortem 
of the Digital Television Broadcast Flag, 42 Hous. L. REV. 1129 (2005). The specific issue 
of the broadcast flag is sure to recur in other contexts. Also, attempts to read American 
Library Ass 'n as a broad limitation on the reach of the FCC's regulatory power likely must 
be rethought in the wake of National Cable & Telecommunications. Ass 'n v. Brand X Inter-
net Services, 545 U.S. 967 (2005), in which the Supreme Court applied Chevron deference 
to an FCC ruling. 
67. The developers of both formats vying to replace the DVD Video disc - HD-DVD 
and Blu-Ray - have settled on a common DRM mechanism, the Advanced Access Content 
System ("AACS") that both types of discs will employ. See Wikipedia, Advanced Access 
Content System, http://en.wikipedia.org/wikiiAdvanced_Access_ Content_System (as of 
Nov. 16,2006,22:10 GMT). 
68. Digital Transition Content Security Act of 2005, H.R. 4569, 109th Congo (I st Sess. 
2005). For a skeptical appraisal of the bill and the term "analog hole" in general, see Ed-
ward W. Felten, The Professional Device Hole (Jan. 12, 2006), http://www.freedom-to-
tinker.coml?p=954. 
69. See, e.g., Cory Doctorow, Microsoft Research DRM Talk (June 17, 2004), 
http://craphound.com/msftdrm.txt ("At the end of the day, all DRM systems share a com-
mon vulnerability: they provide their attackers with ciphertext, the cipher and the key."); 
Edward W. Felten, DMCA, and Disrupting the Darknet (Aug. 17, 2005), 
http://www.freedom-to-tinker.coml?p=889 ("Files arrive on the darknet having already been 
stripped of any technological protection measures .... And you can't circumvent a TPM 
that isn't there."); see also supra note 3. 
70. Some authors have described the desired capability of DRM schemes to resist attack 
as follows: 
DRM systems strive to be BOBE (break once, break everywhere)-
resistant. That is, suppliers anticipate that individual instances (cli-
ents) of all security systems, whether based on hardware or software, 
will be subverted. If a client of a system is subverted, then all content 
protected by that DRM client can be unprotected. If the break can be 
applied to any other DRM client of that class so that all of those users 
can break their systems, then the DRM-scheme is BOBE-weak. If, on 
the other hand, knowledge gained breaking one client cannot be ap-
plied elsewhere, then the DRM system is BOBE-strong. 
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The efficacy of any DRM measure is determined only partly by 
technological constraints. Also important are the freedoms the DRM 
mechanism presents to end users of the protected content. Other 
things being equal, users prefer alternatives that maximize flexibility 
in use of the content.72 Content that can be accessed from multiple 
locations and multiple devices is more attractive than content that is 
tethered to a particular location or device. If DRM mechanisms inter-
fere with user preferences in the manner of use of the underlying con-
tent, users are more likely to "cheat" - to circumvent the DRM 
protections - in order to obtain unfettered access to the protected 
content?3 Recognition that technological measures alone are unlikely 
to be sufficient to deter infringement has spurred copyright industry 
representatives to seek stronger legal protections for DRM mecha-
nIsms. 
2. Anti-Circumvention Restrictions 
Content providers lobbied in the mid-1990s for the passage of in-
ternational measures dealing with DRM circumvention, and were re-
warded in 1996 with the adoption of two new copyright treaties by 
WIPO. Article 11 of the WI PO Copyright Treaty ("WCT") required 
signatory nations, including the United States, to 
provide adequate legal protection and effective legal 
remedies against the circumvention of effective 
technological measures that are used by authors in 
connection with the exercise of their rights under this 
Treaty or the Berne Convention and that restrict acts, 
in respect of their works, which are not authorized by 
the authors concerned or permitted by law.74 
Peter Biddle et aI., The Darknet and the FlItllre ojContent Distriblltion, in DIGITAL RIGHTS 
MANAGEMENT: ACM CCS-9 WORKSHOP, DRM 2002, LNCS 2696, at ISS, 169 (Joan Fei-
genbaum ed., 2003); see also Markus Schneider & Anders Henten, DRMS and TCP: Tech-
nology and Law 5 (CTf Working Papers No. 76, 2003), available at http:// 
www.dtu.dklupload/centre/cict/publications/working%20papers/ctiwp76.pdf. 
71. See. e.g., Ryan Roemer, Locking Down Loose Bits: Trusted Compllting. Digital 
Rights Management. and the Fight jor Copyright Control on YOllr Computer, 7 UCLA J.L. 
& TECH. 8, 8 (2003), http://www.lawtechjournal.com/articles/2003/08_040223_roemer.pdf. 
72. See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text. 
73. See Rachna Dhamija & Fredrik Wallenberg, A Framework jor Evaillating Digital 
Rights Management Proposals, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL MOBILE 
IPR WORKSHOP: RIGHTS MANAGEMENT OF INFORMATION PRODUCTS ON THE MOBILE 
INTERNET 13, 14 (Olli Pitkanen ed., 2003), available at 
http://www.hiit.fi/publications/pub_files/mobileipr2003-2.pdf (arguing that "DRM systems 
that artificially make a product either excludable or rival invite circumvention activities by 
end users (who realize that, if they could remove the technical barriers, the product is nei-
ther excludable nor rival)"). 
74. WIPO Copyright Treaty, supra note 43, art. II. 
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The contemporaneously adopted WIPO Performances and Phono-
grams Treaty ("WPPT") included similar requirements.75 Despite ar-
guments that United States law already supplied the legal protections 
the WCT and WPPT demanded, Congress ultimately concluded that 
new legislation was required to implement these treaty obligations. 
Congress enacted new legal protections against circumvention of 
DRM mechanisms in the DMCA.76 The DMCA puts legal weight be-
hind privately developed technological mechanisms for limiting unau-
thorized distribution of digital content by prohibiting both the 
circumvention of access control measures77 and the trafficking of cir-
cumvention devices.78 By outlawing circumvention and circumven-
tion devices, the DMCA arguably improves the efficacy of DRM 
measures and inhibits copyright infringement. 
Several provisions of the statute are aimed at boosting the effi-
cacy of DRM mechanisms. First, the DMCA's anti-circumvention 
provision provides: "No person shall circumvent a technological 
measure that effectively controls access to a work protected under this 
title.,,79 Second, the statute's anti-trafficking provision states: 
No person shall manufacture, import, offer to the 
public, provide, or otherwise traffic in any technol-
ogy ... that: 
(A) is primarily designed or produced for the pur-
pose of circumventing a technological measure that 
effectively controls access to a work protected under 
this title; 
(B) has only limited commercially significant pur-
pose or use other than to circumvent a technological 
measure that effectively controls access to a work 
protected under this title; or 
(C) is marketed by that person or another acting in 
concert with that person with that person's knowl-
edge for use in circumventing a technological meas-
ure that effectively controls access to a work 
protected under this title.80 
75. WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, supra note 43, art. 18. 
76. Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2360 (1998) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.c. 
§§ 1201-1205 (2000». 
77.17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(I)(A). 
78.1d. § 1201(a)(2). 
79.1d. § 1201(a)(I)(A). 
80.1d. § 1201(a)(2). 
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Finally, a third provision of the statute forbids production or traf-
ficking in devices that circumvent any "technological measure that 
effectively protects a right of a copyright owner" in specified circum-
stances.S1 
3. Fair Use and the DMCA 
The DMCA's prohibitions against both DRM circumvention and 
the creation of circumvention devices potentially erode the protections 
in U.S. copyright law allowing fair use of copyrighted works. Where 
digital content is protected by a DRM wrapper (even a trivial one, as 
in the case of CSS) and none of the DMCA's exceptions apply, cir-
cumventing the DRM may violate the DMCA even if the use of the 
accessed content would be protected under the fair use doctrine. 
The tension between the DMCA and the fair use provisions of 
copyright law is not commanded by the statutory text or history. To 
the contrary, there are indications that the provisions were intended to 
coexist harmoniously. First, the DMCA's anti-circumvention rules 
were adopted to implement Article 11 of the WCT. That Article 
obliges member states to protect DRM mechanisms against circum-
vention when the use of the work is "not authorized by the authors 
concemed or permitted by law."s2 Fair use of copyrighted works is 
expressly "permitted by law" in the United States. Accordingly, a 
statutory prohibition on circumventing DRM that hinders fair use goes 
well beyond the requirements of the WCT. Second, the DMCA itself 
purports to preserve fair use rights in DRM-protected copyrighted 
works. s3 
Early judicial interpretations of the DMCA, however, found that 
the anti-circumvention provisions overrode the protections for fair use 
in the general copyright statute. In Universal City Studios, Inc. v. 
Reimerdes, for example, the court considered whether the fair use 
doctrine supplied a defense against alleged violations of the DMCA's 
anti-circumvention provisions.s4 The court noted that the DMCA in-
cluded a number of explicit exceptions to the anti-circumvention pro-
visions, but that fair use was not among the exceptions listed.s5 The 
court reasoned that the legislature's omission of an explicit provision 
allowing DRM circumvention for fair use meant that fair use provided 
81.1d. § 1201(b)(I)(C). 
82. WIPO Copyright Treaty, supra note 43. art. II (emphasis added). 
83. 17 U.S.c. § 120 I (c)( I) ("Nothing in this section shall affect rights. remedies. limita-
tions. or defenses to copyright infringement. including fair use. under this title."). 
84. Universal City Studios. Inc. v. Reimerdes. III F. Supp. 2d 294. 321-24 (S.D.N.Y. 
2000). ajf'd sub nom. Universal City Studios. Inc. v. Corley. 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001). 
8S./d. at 322-23. 
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no defense to an alleged violation of the DMCA.86 The Court of Ap-
peals rejected the defendants' argument that an implicit "fair use ex-
ception" to the DMCA was constitutionally required under First 
Amendment principles.87 
Judicial glosses on the DMCA, accordingly, appear to prohibit 
circumvention of DRM mechanisms, even if the purpose of circum-
vention is to engage in a fair use of the underlying content. This pro-
hibition prevents the DMCA from fulfilling one of its purposes, for it 
creates incentives to break the law to engage in fair use. A legal and 
technological structure for DRM that preserves the right and opportu-
nity to make fair use of copyrighted works would align the law and 
users' incentives in a way that the DMCA, as presently construed, 
does not. As will be seen, however, most existing and proposed DRM 
mechanisms, even those purportedly designed with fair use in mind, 
may poorly serve users' interests. 
III. TECHNOLOGICAL ACCOMMODATION FOR FAIR USE IN 
MODERN DRM SYSTEMS 
A. Local Authorization 
I. Rights Management Architecture 
In the most common type of contemporary DRM mechanism, the 
decision whether to allow or deny a requested use of the DRM-
protected content occurs at the local end user level.88 User permis-
86. Id.; see also id. at 324 ("The fact that Congress elected to leave technologically unso-
phisticated persons who wish to make fair use of encrypted copyrighted works without the 
technical means of doing so is a matter for Congress .... "); RealNetworks, Inc. v. Stream-
box, Inc., No. 2:99CV02070, 2000 WL 127311, at "8 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 18,2000) (rejecting 
possible fair use defense to alleged DMCA violation). 
87. Corley, 273 FJd at 458 (2d Cir. 2001). On this point, the Corley panel's decision 
may carry less force in the wake of Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003). In finding that 
the Copyright Term Extension Act did not violate the First Amendment, the Supreme Court 
noted that "copyright law contains built-in First Amendment accommodations," including 
the fair use defense. Id. at 219-20; see also Stephen M. McJohn, Eldred 's Aftermath: Tradi-
tion. the Copyright Clause, and the Constitutionalization of Fair Use, 10 MICH. TELECOMM. 
& TECH. L. REv. 95, 130-31 (2003) ("Under the Eldred analysis, the availability of fair use 
is central to the constitutional basis of copyright protection. Thus, fair use after Eldred . .. 
can now also be more explicitly used to protect First Amendment values.") (footnotes omit-
ted). 
88. My focus in this section and those that follow is on the locus of the authorization de-
cision that determines whether a given attempt to use DRM-protected content will succeed 
or fail. To be sure, even DRM mechanisms that make the authorization decision wholly at 
the local user level may be designed to communicate or share information with other parties, 
for ends that mayor may not be benign. For a discussion of some of the possible types of 
information sharing that might occur even in a system designed to make authorization deci-
sions at the local level, see Edward W. Felten, Google Video and Privacy (Jan. 20, 2006), 
http://www.freedom-to-tinker.coml?p=956. 
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sions are encoded directly into the purchased content or accompany-
ing metadata. The CSS technology protecting DVD video discs typi-
fies one such system: by purchasing a licensed DVD player and a 
DVD, the user acquires all the pieces necessary for the authorization 
mechanism to function. It is unnecessary for the user, or the user's 
hardware, to communicate with any outside authority in order to de-
crypt the CSS-protected content on the disc.89 The CSS authorization 
process takes place at the point of use between the encoded disc and 
the user's DVD player, without the involvement of any external deci-
. k 90 slonma er. 
Local authorization offers users several advantages. For one, digi-
tal media that contains all the information necessary for its own de-
cryption is highly portable, because users do not need to maintain a 
network connection at the point of use. Another advantage is that no 
user-identifying information need be disclosed to obtain local authori-
zation, so this type of system preserves anonymity - one of the de-
fining characteristics offair use in the offline domain.91 
CSS is a relatively simple DRM mechanism that exists for the 
limited purpose of ensuring that DVD video discs are played on a li-
censed DVD player. Other DRM mechanisms, however, are based on 
Rights Expression Languages ("RELs") capable of modeling far more 
sophisticated sets of user permissions at the local level. One such sys-
tem that has achieved widespread use is the "eXtensible rights 
Markup Language" ("XrML"), billed as "the digital rights language 
for trusted content and services.,,92 XrML describes grants of rights to 
end users using markup tags based on the Extensible Markup Lan-
guage ("XML"). XrML allows rights holders to specify particular 
uses of their content that are to be permitted, to limit grants of rights 
to particular users or classes of users, to place time or geographical 
limitations on exercise of the rights granted, and to condition exercise 
of the rights granted on the user's compliance with one or more pre-
conditions such as the payment of a subscription or per-use fee.9 In-
89. DVD discs differ in this regard from DlVX, a now-forgotten early competitor of 
DVD technology in the 120mm disc form factor. DIVX employed a subscription-plus-rental 
model in which it was necessary for the user's player to contact a remote server to obtain 
authorization to playa disc. See infra note 115 and accompanying text. 
90. See generally Corley, 273 FJd at 436-37 (explaining CSS authorization mechanism); 
JIM TAYLOR, DVD DEMYSTIFIED 192-93 (2d ed. 200 I). 
91. See supra Part II.A. But cf supra note 88 (explaining how user anonymity could be 
compromised even when authorization decisions are made at the user level). 
92. About XrML, http://www.xrml.orglabout.asp (last visited Nov. 16, 2006). For recog-
nition that XrML is sufficiently widespread to amount to a de facto standard, see, for exam-
ple, Daniel Benoliel, Technological Standards Inc.: Rethinking Cyber~pace Regulatory 
Epistemology, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1069, 1095 n.103 (2004) ("[A]mong the programming lan-
guages with the widest installed base [is] ... eXtensible rights Markup Language (XrML) 
2.0. 
93. See About XrML, supra note 92. 
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telligently combining these various functionalities may allow rights 
holders to define grants of rights with great sophistication and detail.94 
2. Protections for Fair Use 
Despite their flexibility, DRM systems that rely entirely on local 
authorization may not effectively protect fair use rights. A review of 
some of the proposals to add protections for fair use to such systems 
reveals inherent shortcomings of the local authorization approach. 
Two authors suggested modeling a useful subset of fair use rights 
in a DRM mechanism as "generalized grants from Congress" of per-
missions to use content in specified ways.95 The rights they proposed 
to model, however, fall well short of the uses typically recognized as 
fair under federal copyright law. They initially proposed encoding 
into every DRM system a right to make one copy of a digital work for 
personal use, conditioned on prior authentication by specialized hard-
ware components: 
A possible starting place for the set of permissions 
first designated as residing within the safe harbor 
might be to permit a single copy of a digital work 
(exclusively for personal use) to a designated and 
verifiable network of devices. The security and 
auditability of such a "personal domain" could be 
guaranteed by the required presence of a secure 
hardware component (such as a USB token or smart 
card) acquired via a license .... The problem - au-
thenticating the copying device and ensuring that 
only one copy can be made - is clearly difficult but 
. bl 96 not msurmounta e. 
94. I will cite XrML in the remainder of this article as a prototypical REL for local au-
thorization DRM for simplicity and avoidance of duplicative examples. For another exam-
ple of an influential XML-based REL, however, see The Open Digital Rights Language 
Initiative, http://odrl.net (last visited Nov. 16, 2006). 
95. Barbara L. Fox & Brian A. LaMacchia, Encouraging Recognition of Fair Uses in 
DRM Systems, COMM. ACM, Apr. 2003, at 61, 63. 
96./d. The plan's reliance on secure hardware systems ("a designated and verifiable net-
work of devices") might be a reflection of the fact that the authors were at the time employ-
ees of Microsoft Corporation, an advocate of "trusted systems" relying on closed, 
proprietary hardware made to inhibit free interoperability. See, e.g., Wikipedia, Next-
Generation Secure Computing Base, http://en.wikipedia.orglwikilNext-Generation_Secure_ 
Computing_Base (as of Nov. 16,2006,21 :48 GMT). Market research, however, has consis-
tently identified interoperability and media portability as important preconditions to con-
sumer acceptance of DRM, suggesting that solutions based upon specialized hardware 
requirements may prove to be suboptimal. See, e.g., Press Release, GartnerG2, GartnerG2 
Says Digital Media Publishers Must Have Portable Digital Rights Management Standards or 
They Risk Alienating Consumers (Aug. 13, 2003), http://www.gartner.com/press_releases/ 
prl3aug2003a.html. For a recent review of the development of interoperable DRM tech-
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Recognizing the limitations of their proposal, the authors suggested 
that it was intended merely as a proof of concept for what "ulti-
mately" may become "a series of expanding safe harbors for modeling 
larger and larger subsets of fair use rights in DRM systems.',97 The 
authors did not address what rights those future subsets may include 
or how they would be recognized in DRM mechanisms (particularly 
as to content previously issued under more restrictive DRM). 
The design of XrML itself illustrates one of the chief difficulties 
of relying on locally authorized DRM mechanisms to protect fair use 
rights. XrML is a device for expressing grants of rights to access or 
use content in certain ways. One of the assumptions of an XrML-
based DRM system is that such a grant of rights is necessary before 
the user may engage in the conduct specified in the grant. In opera-
tion, XrML checks the action the user wishes to take against the list of 
grants specified in the license or licenses applicable to the user.98 If no 
matching grant is found in any license, the DRM system prevents the 
user from engaging in the requested use of the content.99 In other 
words, in an XrML-based DRM system, all uses not expressly permit-
ted are forbidden. The system denies permission by default; a user 
may engage in a use of the content only if the desired use has been 
encoded in the terms of the grant of rights. 
In a DRM system that relies entirely on local authorization, this 
"deny by default" design impedes fair use by limiting the scope of 
available rights to those within the foresight of the original license 
issuer. Because the DRM prevents users from engaging in any uses 
not expressed ex ante in the grant, "[i]f fair use privileges and other 
legitimate interests of information users cannot be expressed in an 
REL, such interests simply do not exist within the system.',IOO 
Modeling the substantive law of fair use in a machine-executable 
XrML grant is difficult or impossible. The open-ended fair use defini-
tion in the federal copyright statute may be particularly ill-suited to 
reduction to an algorithm. Indeed, even a functional computer-
administered fair use regime might noticeably contract the scope of 
rights that users presently enjoy. Princeton University computer scien-
tist Edward Felten has recognized both of these problems: 
nologies, see John Palfrey, Holding Out for an Interoperable DRM Standard, in DIGITAL 
RIGHTS MANAGEMENT: THE END OF COLLECTING SOCIETIES? I (Christoph Beat Graber et 
al. eds., 2005). 
97. Fox & LaMacchia, supra note 95, at 63. 
98. See XrML 2.0 Technical Overview 4 (Mar. 8,2002), http://www.xrml.org/Reference/ 
XrML TechnicalOverviewV I.pdf. 
99. See id. 
100. Bechtold, supra note 7 (emphasis added); see also Fox & LaMacchia, supra note 95, 
at 61 ("Only actions explicitly authorized by content owners or their delegate(s) are al-
lowed, and the only 'rights' are those explicitly granted by them and presented to the DRM 
system."). 
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The legal definition of fair use is, by computer sci-
entists' standards, maddeningly vague. No enumera-
tion of fair uses is provided. There is not even a 
precise algorithm for deciding whether a particular 
use is fair. Instead, the law says that judges should 
make case-by-case decisions based on four fac-
tors. . . . The law does not say exactly how these 
factors should be evaluated or even how the factors 
should be weighted against one another. 
To a computer scientist, such imprecision is a bug; 
to lawyers it is a feature, since it allows judges to 
take into account the unique circumstances of each 
case. Making fair use a judgment call allows the fair 
use doctrine to evolve in light of technological inno-
vation. It provides a kind of flexibility and adaptabil-
ity that would not be possible with a more precisely 
'fi d I 101 specI Ie ru e. 
[Vol. 20 
Professor Felten also highlighted the difficulty of providing any 
computer program with the information necessary to enable an ex ante 
decision regarding whether a given use is fair. I 02 He then articulated 
the difficulty in designing an artificial-intelligence system sophisti-
cated enough to mimic the sifting and weighing of a mass of complex 
and contradictory evidence that a human judge might undertake In 
evaluating the fairness of a given use: 
For instance, the fourth factor in the test evaluates 
the effect of the use on the market for the original 
work. It requires reasoning about the economics of a 
particular market, a task even well-trained humans 
find difficult. For the foreseeable future, no com-
101. Felten, supra note 9, at 58. 
102. See id. (hypothesizing that a DRM system cannot know, for example, whether a 
given use is conducted in a classroom setting, which would weigh in favor of a finding of 
fair use); see also John S. Erickson & Deirdre K. Mulligan, The Technical and Legal Dan-
gers of Code-Based Fair Use Enforcement, 92 PRoc.IEEE 985, 986 (2004) (also noting the 
difficulty of describing fair use factors in machine-interpretable form). Although his general 
point is surely valid, Professor Felten's specific example may not be particularly forceful. 
See, e.g., Severine Dusollier, Fair Use by Design in the European Copyright Directive of 
2001, COMM. ACM, Apr. 2003, at 51, 52 ("Fair use principles may be embedded in the 
design of technological protection measures; for example, the digital rights management 
system can acknowledge the individual requesting a copy of the work as a teacher, allowing 
this person to take a portion of the work for quotation."); ContentGuard, eXtensible rights 
Markup Language (XrML) Example Use Cases [hereinafter XrML Example Use Cases] (on 
file with author) (giving many examples of coding special permissions for academic use in 
XrML). 
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puter system will be able to approach a human's 
ability to analyze these markets. 103 
Legal commentators have expressed the same skepticism as Pro-
fessor Felten that technological means alone can achieve an adequate 
a priori approximation of fair use doctrine: 
Building the range of possible uses and outcomes 
into computer code would require both a bewildering 
degree of complexity and an impossible level of pre-
science. There is currently no good algorithm that is 
capable of producing such an analysis. Relatedly, 
fair use is a dynamic, equitable doctrine designed to 
respond to changing conditions of use. Programmed 
fair use functionality, in contrast, is relatively static. 
At least for now, there is no feasible way to build 
rights management code that approximates both the 
individual results of judicial determinations and the 
overall dynamism of fair use jurisprudence. 104 
Other authors, too, have emphasized the technical complexities in-
volved in reducing even a small subset of permissible fair uses to code 
before the actual circumstances giving rise to a claimed fair use are 
kn 105 own. 
If the design of XrML itself makes accommodating fair use rights 
difficult,106 might changing XrML solve the problem?107 Proposed 
extensions to the language would make it easier to express fair use 
rights in XrML. One such extension is the addition of new default 
elements that allow, rather than restrict, certain uses for certain types 
103. Felten, supra note 9, at 58. Of course, even human judges often render decisions that 
depart from the outcome expected by a reasonable consideration of the four statutory fac-
tors. See Nimmer, supra note 10, at 282. 
104. Dan L. Burk & Julie E. Cohen, Fair Use Infrastructure for Rights Management Sys-
tems, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 41, 56 (2001). 
105. See Erickson & Mulligan, supra note 102, at 993 ("To accommodate even some ap-
proximation of actions that may be protected by fair use, authorities must somehow preau-
thorize a set of yet-unspecified actions that the user may invoke for yet-undefined purposes, 
which together will provide users with 'space' for fair use."). 
106. See, e.g., Bechtold, supra note 6, at 604 ("[M]ost current RELs do not provide am-
ple tools to express how and under which conditions content may be reused, altered, refor-
matted, modified or otherwise transformed for the integration -be it in part or as a 
whole - into other works."). 
107. It is not difficult, for example, to imagine an inverted XrML system requiring all re-
strictions on user freedom to be adequately and precisely described before being en-
forced - in other words, a system that would allow all uses except those specifically 
disallowed in the terms of the accompanying XrML code. 
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of protected content. 108 These changes, however, would likely neces-
sitate the abandonment of XrML's assumed agnosticism regarding the 
type of media to which it is applied in a given case. 109 Even more am-
bitious proposals have suggested fundamental changes to XrML by 
challenging the language's "one-way" expression of rights. Under 
these proposals, the information flow of assertions about rights would 
run not only from the copyright holder to the user, but in the opposite 
direction as well. Such a change would require the addition of an ex-
panded Rights Messaging Protocol ("RMP") to XrML to support the 
multidirectional assertion of rights, which would change the language 
in quite substantial ways. 1 10 The very breadth of the various proposals 
for revising XrML, however, confirms a much simpler point: at pre-
sent, the language and the DRM mechanisms in which the language is 
employed are not optimal for recognizing and protecting end user fair 
use rights in digital content. 
These difficulties are inherent to any DRM mechanism that relies 
wholly on local authorization at the end user level to resolve whether 
a user may engage in a desired use of the protected content. The im-
possibility of describing end user fair use rights ex ante in a form that 
can be interpreted and executed by machine - at least with precision 
even approaching the subtlety that a human decisionmaker might pro-
vide - suggests that the solution might be to "introduc[e] ... an ex-
ternal decisionmaker into the process for obtaining access to 
technologically secured works.,,'I' As the next section discusses, 
however, the protection of end user fair use rights in such a system 
would present its own set of complications. 
B. Remote Authorization 
1. Rights Management Architecture 
Some of the limitations on the sophistication of DRM decision-
making that occurs entirely at the end user level might be avoided by 
relying instead on an outside authority to approve requested uses of 
the protected content. In such a remote authorization system, the user 
receives a protected digital file that contains a mechanism for contact-
ing an outside authority to approve requests to use the content in cer-
tain ways, rather than a hard-coded description of preauthorized uses. 
When the user seeks to access or use the protected content, a DRM-
compliant player program contacts a remote server to obtain authori-
lOS. See, e.g., Samuelson Law, Tech. & Pub. Policy Clinic, Supporting Limits on Copy-
right Exclusivity in a Rights Expression Language Standard 11-\2 (Aug. 13, 2002), 
http://xm!.coverpages.org/OASIS-SLTPPC-EPIC-S-13-02.pdf. 
109. See infra note 18S and accompanying text. 
110. See Mulligan & Burstein, supra note 39, at 141; discussion infra Part IV.A.2. 
III. Burk & Cohen, supra note 104, at 59. 
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zation for the use. If the authority for the requested use is granted, the 
player program allows the use; otherwise, it prevents access. 
Remotely administered DRM mechanisms suffer from some un-
deniable practical disadvantages. Because any such system must be 
able to access a remote server to obtain authorization for any desired 
use, the system is inherently ill-suited for use with devices (such as 
portable music players) that lack built-in network connectivity. If the 
player is unable to access a licensing authority, the default - just as 
in an XrML-based DRM system - would be to deny the use. In re-
gions where network connectivity is unreliable or costly, this may be 
a substantial drawback. I 12 Where users access DRM-protected content 
with an appliance not ordinarily connected to a computer network 
(such as a stand-alone DVD player), redesigning the player appliance 
for network connectivity may introduce an additional level of cost and 
complexity that many users will find unappealing and that producers 
may find uneconomical. I 13 
On the other hand, using an external decisionmaker in the au-
thorization process may benefit users in other ways. By potentially 
allowing for human involvement, a remote authorization system per-
mits, at least in principle, a greater level of complexity in the circum-
stances that may be considered. Supplying a technological framework 
for negotiation of usage rights may foster uses and transactions that 
could not have occurred with a less sophisticated DRM mechanism. 
112. D1VX video disc technology, discussed infra note 115 and accompanying text, 
came - and went - during an era when most Americans relied on dial-up access to com-
puter networks. It is interesting to speculate whether D1VX technology would have suffered 
the same fate had it instead evolved in an era of widespread, always-on broadband network 
access. It is possible that the factors sometimes offered to explain DVD's success - such as 
users' putative preferences for owning rather than renting content - would not have proved 
so forceful in the face of lower DIYX prices if consumers did not have to accept the delay 
and inconvenience inherent in the D1VX dial-up rights authorization every time they wished 
to playa disc. 
113. The necessity of communication with a remote server inevitably increases users' 
exposure to security risks beyond those that exist in self-contained local authorization 
mechanisms. In a once-controversial incident that has been all but eclipsed by the Sony 
BMG "rootkit DRM" fiasco, discussed supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text, the com-
pany Overpeer, which had been retained by members of the recording industry to upload 
"spoofed" media files to peer-to-peer ("P2P") networks, uploaded harmful files that relied 
on a flaw in Microsoft Windows' built-in DRM system to infect P2P users' computers with 
spyware and adware. Microsoft's DRM system was designed to communicate with a remote 
server specified in the media file to request license information and terms, but the DRM 
system included no built-in mechanism to ensure that what the server had transmitted was 
actually the terms of a license rather than some other type of software. When a user at-
tempted to play one of Overpeer's infected files, the Windows DRM system dutifully con-
tacted a server specified in the file, which then proceeded to swamp the user's system with 
dozens of pop-up windows and tried surreptitiously to download spyware programs in the 
background. See Andrew Brandt & Eric Dahl, Risk Your PC's Health for a Song?, PC 
WORLD, Dec. 29, 2004, http://www.pcworld.com/article/id.119016/article.html. 
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Real-world examples of consumer-level DRM systems relying on 
remote authorization are few. 114 The now-obsolete DIVX video disc 
technology, an early competitor of DVD discs, was one such system. 
DIVX disc players, unlike contemporary DVD plarers, needed to be 
connected to a telephone line in order to function. I S When a user at-
tempted to playa DIVX disc, the player dialed a remote server to ob-
tain authorization for the playback.116 The user could not view the 
content on the disc until the player had secured the required authoriza-
tion (and, if necessary, until the user's credit card had been charged 
for any specified access fee ).117 Unlike the situation with the CSS 
DRM mechanism employed on DVD discs, mere possession of a disc 
and a player was ordinarily insufficient to enable a user to play a 
DIVX disc. 118 
There have been a few general purpose DRM systems based on 
remote authorization, although they appear to be less common in prac-
tice than DRM mechanisms that make authorization determinations at 
the local user level. A brief sketch of a few remote authorization-
based systems illustrates the range of decisionmaking flexibility that 
their mechanisms offer for DRM-protected digital content. 
The Organization for the Advancement of Structured Information 
Standards ("OASIS"), an international group, has promulgated speci-
fications for the XML-based eXtensible Access Control Markup Lan-
guage ("XACML,,).119 XACML's distinguishing characteristic is that 
it "assumes a highly distributed environment in which all policies, 
attributes, and decisions may be remotely sourced.,,120 The XACML 
specifications define the structure of an XML document, called a 
"policy," that allows users to submit a "request" for a type of access 
to content stated in the policy, and specifies a "response" to be re-
turned to the user upon the receipt of such a request. 12I The policy 
drafter can express a number of conditions and limitations in the pol-
114. Systems of this sort might be encountered more frequently where fair use is not an 
issue, for example, in organizations that need to provide differing levels of access to elec-
tronic records. See. e.g., Robert 1. Mitchell, Rights of Passage, COMPUTER WORLD, July 4, 
2005, available at http://www.computerworld.com/printthis/200S/0.4814.10289I.OO.html; 
Michael Voelker, Content at Risk, TRANSFORM, Oct. 2004, http://www.transformmag.com/ 
shared/cp/print_ article.jhtml?articlelD=4 7902414. 
115. See Wikipedia, D1VX, http://en.wikipedia.orglwiki/DlVX (as of Nov. 16, 2006, 
23:29 GMT). 
116.1d. 
117./d. 
118. See id. 
119. See Org. for the Advancement of Structured Info. Standards, OASIS eXtensible Ac-
cess Control Markup Language (XACML) TC, http://www.oasis-open.orglcommittees/ 
xacml/charter.php (last visited Nov. 16, 2006). 
120. Erickson & Mulligan, supra note 102, at 991. 
121. See Org. for the Advancement of Structured Info. Standards, eXtensible Access 
Control Markup Language (XACML) Version 2.0: Committee Draft 04, at 9-13 (Dec. 6, 
2004), http://docs.oasis-open .orglxacm l/access _ control-xacm 1-2_ 0-core-spec-cd-04. pd f. 
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icy, any of which can supply the basis for triggering a "deny" re-
sponse. 122 If, and only if, all the stated conditions in the policy evalu-
ate to "permit," the remote authority returns a "permit" response to 
the user's request. 123 XACML relies on a remote, server-side program 
to receive and parse user requests (which are then tested against the 
terms of the policy with which the authorization program has been 
supplied) and to return a response to each request. 12 
In another illustration of this type of system, a team of Japanese 
scientists has proposed an online information brokerage called 
"Copymart" that is intended to operate as a clearinghouse for author-
ized digital content. 125 The Copymart system employs its own XML-
based language, the Copyright Management Framework ("CMF"), to 
describe and enforce copyright holders' wishes as to the content they 
contribute to the system. Copyright holders submit content to Copy-
mart marked up with whatever limitations on use they wish to specify 
in a CMF-based license. A user seeking to make use of content avail-
able on Copymart submits a request to the system's "Copy Market" 
server. The server then compares the terms of the request with the 
license information previously supplied by the copyright holder. If the 
terms of the license require a payment for the requested use, and the 
user has authorized payment, the electronic "negotiation" over the 
terms of the license concludes automatically, and the user is permitted 
to engage in the use. 126 Chinese researchers have made a similar pro-
posal that depends on a coordinated exchange of information between 
a user's "personal information server" (which may be the user's own 
122. See id. 
123. See id. 
124. See id. For a description ofXACML's decision logic, including sample policies, re-
quests, and responses, see id. at 24-31. 
125. See Copymart Inst., About Copymart: What is Copymart?, http://www.copymart.jp/ 
cmi/about_eJ,html (last visited Nov. 16,2006) (English-language home page for the Copy-
mart project). 
126. In the interests of clarity and space, I have slightly abridged the full sequence of 
events involved in a Copymart transaction. Fuller explanations may be found in the Copy-
mart creators' academic papers detailing their system. See Masayuki Kumazawa et aI., 
Representation of Reuse Mechanisms for Digital Work with Multiple Right-Holders, in 200 I 
SYMPOSIUM ON ApPLlCA nONS AND THE INTERNET - WORKSHOPS 145, available at 
http://doi.ieeecomputersociety.org/IO.II 09/SAINTW.2001.998222 (abstract describing 
academic paper); Masayuki Kumazawa et aI., Relationship Among Copyright Holders for 
Use and Reuse of Digital Contents, in PROCEEDINGS. OF THE FIFTH ACM CONFERENCE ON 
DIGITAL LIBRARIES. 254 (2000), available at http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/336597.336688 
(abstract describing academic paper). As the article titles suggest, one of Copy mart's adver-
tised strengths is its description of rights held by mUltiple parties, as, for example, where a 
new work is created by combining portions from independently copyrighted pre-existing 
works. Where a given payment must be parceled out among several copyright holders in 
proportion to the contribution of their original works to a new whole, a Copymart-like sys-
tem of automated administration of license negotiations and payment would be particularly 
valuable. Cf FISHER, supra note 4, at 234-36 (describing an arrangement for parceling 
revenues among multiple creators of derivative works under an alternative compensation 
system). 
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computer) and a remote license-administering authority to ascertain 
whether a requested use ofDRM-protected content is permissible. 127 
2. Protections for Fair Use 
How might fair uses be protected under a DRM system relying on 
remote authorization? There are at least some reasons to expect that 
such systems offer more robust protections for fair use rights than 
local authorization systems can. The magnitude of the improvement, 
however, depends heavily upon the characteristics of the particular 
implementation, and systems relying solely on remote authorization 
may introduce their own problems as well. 
At one extreme, a remotely authorized DRM mechanism may be 
designed simply to duplicate the "hard-coded" decision logic of a lo-
cally administered system. That is, the remote computer that receives 
a user's request for authorization for a given use may be running 
software that essentially duplicates, rather than improves upon, the 
capabilities of a locally authorized DRM system such as CSS. In this 
situation, the switch from local to remote authorization makes the user 
no better off- and indeed, may make the user worse off if network 
latency or other connectivity problems delay receipt of the requested 
authorization. 
Despite this drawback, such a system could represent a potential 
improvement over a "hard-coded" local authorization mechanism. If 
permitted uses of digital media are stored on a remote server, it be-
comes relatively simple to simultaneously adjust the permissions for a 
wide variety of media products merely by tweaking the stored permis-
sions. Centralizing, rather than distributing, the information on which 
user access to the underlying content depends provides a way to alter 
the usage rights of many users and many media products at the same 
time. Of course, users might not prefer such centralization, because 
permissions might be modified towards greater restriction. The possi-
bility of a subsequent expansion or improvement in end user rights, 
however, suffices to distinguish a remotely administered mechanism 
from local authorization DRM systems. 
At the opposite extreme, a remotely authorized DRM mechanism 
may be designed such that every requested use is individually evalu-
ated and acted upon by a human administrator. Such a design would 
allow the consideration of the greatest amount of contextual informa-
tion - indeed, the need to reduce such information to machine-
parsable form would be eliminated. On the other hand, the potential 
for delay resulting from human involvement could prove substantial, 
127. See Yuzhong Qu et a!., OREL: An Ontology-based Rights Expression Language, in 
PROC. OF THE THIRTEENTH INT'L WORLD WIDE WEB CONF. (WWW2004): ALTERNATE 
TRACK PAPERS 324, available at http://www.www2004.orglproceedings/docs/2p324.pdf. 
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and the possible sacrifice of user anonymity might also chill contro-
versial, but lawful, uses. 
Between these extremes, one might imagine a system that han-
dled certain requests automatically, while relying on human input for 
other requests. Such a system would fit most naturally into what I 
have labeled a combined or hybrid approach, discussion of which will 
be deferred to the next section. 
Remotely authorized DRM mechanisms potentially allow for the 
consideration of complex contextual information in the process of 
determining whether to authorize a given use of protected content. 
The gain from such additional information is a decision that hopefully 
captures more of the complexity of actual fair use practice and the 
competing interests that characterize situations in the offline world. 
This hoped-for improvement in decisionmaking, however, comes at a 
cost. 
First, because the user must communicate with the licensing au-
thority, anonymous fair use may become difficult or impossible. The 
remote permission requirements unavoidably compromise user pri-
vacy, which may chill fair uses that would occur if privacy could be 
preserved. 128 Similarly, the requirement to await the grant or denial of 
permission from a remote source may inhibit spontaneous fair uses,129 
although this may be less detrimental where the grant-or-deny deci-
sion is automated and essentially instantaneous. 
Perhaps most significantly, the identity of the selected remote li-
censing authority greatly influences the efficacy of a remotely admin-
istered DRM mechanism as a vehicle for preserving fair use rights. 
When a user submits a request to engage in fair use ofDRM-protected 
content, it matters a great deal who decides whether the request 
should be granted. 
A copyright holder that issues content protected by a remotely 
administered DRM mechanism may, for example, require all permis-
sion requests to be submitted through its own license server. There is 
reason to doubt, however, whether a copyright holder would authorize 
requested uses that copyright law would recognize as fair. Because the 
fair use doctrine permits more uses of content than copyright holders 
would likely authorize, a system that allows the copyright holder 
whether to permit or deny given use would sharply curtail fair uses of 
DRM-protected content. For that reason, proponents ofDRM systems 
that rely on remote authorization have generally maintained that such 
128. See Mulligan & Burstein, supra note 39, at 139 (arguing that "[p]rivacy is crucial to 
the full exploration of purchased works" and that the lack of online anonymity "repels peo-
ple from the use of expressive materials"). 
129. See Burk & Cohen, supra note 104, at 59-60. 
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systems should not leave these decisions to the copyright holder 
alone. 130 
To preserve fair use rights, then, it seems we must rule out the 
copyright holder as a candidate to serve as the licensing authority in a 
remotely administered DRM system. But who, then, should operate 
the system? Commentators have not yet settled on a single answer. 
Burk and Cohen have suggested that the government should as-
sume the role of licensing authority.l3l They reason that copyright 
holders should not be placed in the position of controlling or finan-
cially influencing the decisions made by the licensing authority be-
cause of their obvious interests in limiting fair uses. 132 Would-be fair 
users, in tum, might have an incentive to finance the operation of a 
fair use rights clearinghouse, but are generally assumed to lack the 
means to do so or to organize effectively on their own behalf.133 Ab-
sent a strong reason to believe that either content owners or users 
should be placed in the position of establishing a licensing authority to 
authorize fair uses of copyrighted works, the authors conclude that the 
government should perform this function. 134 Sound policy considera-
tions might also weigh in favor of a government-operated licensing 
authority because "the public policies underlying fair use require 
some guarantees of public accountability and institutional longev-
ity.,,135 For that reason, the authors conclude, users should be able to 
apply to the Library of Congress (or some other governmental body) 
for permission to make fair uses ofDRM-protected content. 136 
Mulligan and Burstein offer an alternative conception. In their 
view, economic competition among multiple private licensing authori-
ties is most likely to yield the greatest protection for end user rights. 137 
Therefore, they recommend that users be permitted to choose any of 
several licensing authorities when requesting authorization for a de-
130. See id. at 59 ("[T)here may be a strong incentive for the rights holder to deny access 
just when the public interest most demands access."); Erickson & Mulligan, supra note 102, 
at 993 (stating that a remotely authorized DRM system "has the advantage of injecting 
human judgment into the flow and can accommodate uses that might be contrary to the 
interests of the rights holder/originator, if the decision maker is an independent third parry") 
(emphasis added). 
131. Burk & Cohen, supra note 104, at 66-67. 
132. Id. at 66 ("Content owners are unlikely to pay voluntarily for an institution that fa-
cilitates low cost or free access to their works."). 
133. See id. 
134.1d. 
135.1d. 
136.1d. at 66-67. This proposal is consistent with other authors' arguments that fair use 
may be conceptualized as a set of permissions granted by the government that override 
denials of permissions from copyright holders. See Fox & LaMacchia, supra note 95, at 63 
("To the extent that fair use rights can be encoded as generalized grants from Congress that 
always exist in the evaluation space of a DRM system's policy evaluator, they can always 
be considered when determining whether a particular action is allowed."). 
137. Mulligan & Burstein, supra note 39, at 152. 
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sired use. 138 To prevent anyone licensing authority from acquiring a 
dominant position and then being subverted by copyright owners, us-
ers should remain free to switch from one licensing authority to an-
h . 139 ot er at any tIme. 
Depending on the identity of the licensing authority, a DRM sys-
tem based on remote authorization may offer users protections for fair 
use far exceeding those that can be hard-coded into a local authoriza-
tion mechanism, but at the cost of anonymity and spontaneity. Efforts 
to redress these shortcomings and preserve the breadth of fair uses 
protectible under a remote authorization system underlie the last ma-
jor category ofDRM technologies to be considered here. 
C. A Hybrid Approach 
1. Rights Management Architecture 
The strengths of DRM systems designed to complete the authori-
zation process at the local end user level lie in their immediacy of re-
sponse and their capacity for accommodating anonymous and 
spontaneous uses of digital works. Their weaknesses lie in the limited 
protections they can provide for fair use due to the difficulty of reduc-
ing complex contextual information to machine-interpretable form. 
Remote authorization DRM mechanisms, in contrast, can potentially 
take into account a great deal of such contextual data, and thus can 
accommodate a far greater range of end user rights, while sacrificing 
immediacy and user anonymity. 
What I have labeled the hybrid approach attempts to use the re-
spective strengths of the local authorization and remote authorization 
approaches to offset each other's weaknesses. It aims for a synthesis 
that exceeds, in flexibility and power, the predecessor systems from 
which it draws. The basic concept is relatively simple: media files 
protected by a DRM mechanism of this type include built-in permis-
sions governing a range of preauthorized uses. Unlike in a pure local 
authorization system, however, the hard-coded permissions do not 
define the totality of possible uses of the protected content. Instead, 
uses that are not covered by the built-in permissions may be author-
ized remotely through communication with a licensing authority, as 
with a remote authorization DRM mechanism. By combining the 
built-in defaults of local authorization with the case-by-case extensi-
138.1d. ("It is therefore essential that the REL allow users [to] be able to control the 
choice of processing system .... "). 
139.1d. The harm to be prevented here involves possible strategic behavior on the part of 
the licensing authorities, competing among themselves in a "race to the bottom" to limit 
user freedoms in the hope of reward from copyright holders in the form of a designation as a 
preferred (or required) source for processing user requests. 
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bility of remote authorization, a hybrid mechanism could solve most 
of the major weaknesses inherent in earlier DRM designs. 
Perhaps due to the greater complexity of a hybrid system, no ex-
tant DRM mechanism fits cleanly into this category. Some of the re-
mote authorization systems discussed in the preceding section may 
shade into hybrid systems at the margin, depending on the particulars 
of the implementation at issue. An XACML-based DRM system,140 
for example, might in practice amount to a hybrid system if it is de-
signed to forward some, but not all authorization requests to a remote 
licensing authority. That is to say, although XACML permits authori-
zation decisions to be "remotely sourced,,,141 it does not appear to 
require remote authorization in every instance. An XACML-based 
DRM system designed to process certain usage requests internally, 
without requiring communication with a remote licensing server, 
would essentially be a hybrid DRM mechanism. 
Burk and Cohen offer a view of a hybrid DRM mechanism ex-
pressly designed to preserve fair use rights to the greatest extent. 142 
The result is a "mixed fair use infrastructure," which consists of two 
"layers" that implement local and remote authorization compo-
nents. 143 
At the first layer, Burk and Cohen's mixed fair use infrastructure 
would mandate the inclusion of "automatic fair use defaults based on 
customary norms of personal noncommercial use.,,144 Because copy-
right holders might otherwise lack any incentive to include such 
automatic defaults when issuing their own content in digital form, 
Burk and Cohen would amend the Copyright Act to condition the en-
forceability of copyrights in United States works on compliance with 
the fair use defaults. 145 Recognizing the risk that courts may miscon-
strue this legislatively mandated floor as a ceiling for fair use, Burk 
and Cohen's proposed "law would clearly state that the level of copy-
ing permitted by the automatic defaults does not define the full extent 
of permitted fair use.,,146 Because rights included in the first layer 
would be preauthorized without the need to communicate with a re-
mote server to obtain additional authority, users would be free to ex-
ercise this encoded subset of fair use defaults anonymously and 
spontaneously. 
At the second layer, the mixed fair use infrastructure would im-
plement a remote authorization DRM mechanism allowing users, 
upon a proper showing, to obtain from an escrow agent the digital 
140. See supra notes 119-24 and accompanying text. 
141. Erickson & Mulligan, supra note 102, at 990. 
142. Burk & Cohen, supra note 104. 
143.1d. at 65. 
144.1d. 
145.1d. 
146.1d. 
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keys necessary to make uses of the protected work beyond the auto-
mated defaults. 147 Again, to remedy the problem of copyright holder 
incentives, Burk and Cohen would condition the statutory protection 
of DRM against circumvention upon the inclusion of a mechanism for 
obtaining remote authorization for fair uses. 148 Thus, a copyright 
holder could decline to provide any means for authorizing fair uses 
beyond the mandatory defaults, but if it declined to do so, users would 
be free to circumvent the DRM mechanism for noninfringing pur-
poses without penalty.149 If the copyright holder did include such a 
mechanism for obtaining remote authorization, it would be entitled, 
under Burk and Cohen's proposal, to pursue anti-circumvention com-
plaints against users who engaged in uses that had not been authorized 
either by the built-in first layer defaults or by a remote licensing au-
h . 150 t onty. 
Burk and Cohen's proposal places the U.S. government - spe-
cifically, the Library of Congress - in the role of remote licensing 
authority. They reason that the Library of Congress would be well 
suited to perform this role both because, among other advantages, it 
has specialized institutional expertise and because copyright owners 
could be required to make works available to the Library in unpro-
tected form: 
The Library of Congress's long experience with 
copyright matters and with the deposit and archival 
preservation of copyrighted works makes it the ideal 
candidate to fill the escrow role. In our view, more-
over, the deposit requirement that currently applies 
to published or registered works would require copy-
right owners to provide the Library of Congress with 
the unrestricted ability to read, view, or listen to the 
work and to subject the work to any digital storage 
and search tools that the Library might develop or 
acquire. Our proposal offers a means of administer-
ing fair use access to these deposited works. Finally, 
the tradition of strong privacy protection by libraries, 
including the Library of Congress, makes such an in-
stitution best suited to maintaining the privacy of fair 
users. Funding for the fair use infrastructure could be 
provided either through general taxation, by a small 
147. Id. at 65--{j6. 
148.Id. 
149.ld at 66 ("For such unescrowed works, a 'right to hack' would effectively substitute 
for access via the escrowed keys."). Presumably, to effectuate such a right, it would also be 
necessary to amend the DMCA to make the distribution and use of such circumventing tools 
lawful. 
150. See id. 
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administrative fee levied on copyright owners, or by 
some combination of the twO. 15 
[Vol. 20 
Burk and Cohen's mixed fair use infrastructure contemplates pro-
tections that, in the aggregate, potentially allow a greater variety of 
uses than do more restrictive traditional DRM mechanisms. Burk and 
Cohen also recognize that acceptance of their system might depend on 
guaranteed protection of trade secrets in light of the relaxation on al-
lowed uses. To prevent the system from becoming a tool for commer-
cial espionage, Burk and Cohen would exempt any work protected by 
trade secret law from their system, albeit with the express caveat that 
"[aJ work should not be deemed to contain trade secrets simply be-
cause the copyright owner has elected to shroud it with technological 
protection. ,,152 
2. Protections for Fair Use 
How well would a hybrid DRM system such as Burk and Cohen's 
protect fair uses of copyrighted works? Burk and Cohen acknowledge 
that the open-ended character of fair use under United States law 
makes it particularly difficult to model in machine-executable form, 
especially when contrasted with the more discrete, specific copyright 
exceptions traditionally recognized under European law. 153 Even 
European law, however, includes its share of ill-defined, context-
dependent standards that would be challenging to describe in terms 
amenable to automated execution. 154 Both American and European 
users, Burk and Cohen believe, would ultimately benefit from the type 
of system they describe: 
Our proposal will not exactly reproduce the condi-
tions of fair use in traditional media. Although code 
is malleable, digital media work differently than tra-
ditional media in too many ways. Nonetheless, we 
think that a mixed fair use infrastructure based on 
both automatic default and key escrow elements 
would go a long way toward approximating tradi-
tional fair use conditions. We note, as well, that de-
151. Id at 66-67 (footnotes omitted). Of course, a rights management proposal premised 
upon a "tradition of strong privacy protection by libraries" must contend with the reality of 
diminished protections available under Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act, 50 U.S.C.A. 
§ 1861 (2006), as well as the present administration's litigation posture that the procedural 
requirements of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act ("FISA"), 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 1801-
1862 (2006), are optional in any event. 
152. Burk & Cohen, supra note 104, at 67. 
153.ld. at 70. 
154.ld at 70 & n.83; see also infra note 285 and accompanying text. 
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velopment of a mixed infrastructure for digital fair 
use might lead to recognition of "new" fair uses 
never needed for works in nondigital media - for 
example, a right to access a work for certain pur-
poses after expiration of a time-limited sUbscription 
agreement. Thus, our proposal would enable the con-
tinued evolution of fair use practices and norms. ISS 
Hybrid DRM mechanisms promise to better approximate fair use 
than either local or remote authorization alone could. Local authoriza-
tion mechanisms are desirable insofar as they allow anonymous, spon-
taneous uses of the protected content, but they are heavily dependent 
upon the foresight of the DRM developer to anticipate particular fair 
uses, and may be unable to accommodate the types of contextual de-
tail underlying legal decisions on fair use. Remote a~thorization 
mechanisms are desirable insofar as they allow users to acquire neces-
sary permissions separately from the protected content and may rein-
troduce an element of human decisionrnaking into the authorization 
process, but the improvement sacrifices user anonymity and may also 
inhibit spontaneity. Alternatively, a combination of local and remote 
authorization - using the strengths of each approach to offset the 
weaknesses of the other - may create a tolerably close approxima-
tion of fair use rights as they exist in the offline world. A hybrid DRM 
mechanism potentially allows a content-rich, context-sensitive envi-
ronment for fair uses ofDRM-protected digital works. 
D. Lingering Problems 
Despite the improvements available in a hybrid DRM mechanism 
over systems relying wholly upon local or remote authorization, such 
a system might fail to duplicate the conditions of fair use as closely as 
its proponents contend. Although a hybrid DRM mechanism has cer-
tain advantages over less technologically sophisticated alternatives, it 
relies on inherent design features and technological assumptions that 
may prevent it from fully implementing fair use rights. 
1. The Requirement of Permission 
One feature common to local authorization, remote authorization, 
and hybrid DRM systems is the requirement that the user obtain per-
mission for any desired use. The various systems differ as to how that 
155. Burk & Cohen, supra note 104, at 70. I share Burk and Cohen's goal of "enabl[ing] 
the continued evolution of fair use practices and norms" in the digital domain. See supra 
note 20. As discussed infra Part 111.0, however, Burk and Cohen's design seems to me 
poorly suited to enable such an evolution. 
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permission is described, sought, and granted, but the requirement of 
permission is a constant. Permission becomes the sine qua non of ac-
cess; if the request for authorization is denied, the DRM mechanism 
refuses to permit the user to engage in the requested use. 
Thus, the "deny by default" regime criticized in the discussion of 
local authorization DRM mechanisms continues,156 in only slightly 
modified form, in remote authorization and hybrid DRM systems. 
Each establishes a procedure - a list of steps that must be fol-
lowed - to effectuate a user's wish to employ the DRM-protected 
content in some fashion. Each of the required steps must be carried 
out, and the authorization must be communicated in the fashion the 
DRM mechanism is programmed to recognize, or else the content 
remains inaccessible. The requirement of permission, however varied 
in its particulars from one design to the next, always bars the re-
quested use of the work unless and until its conditions are satisfied. 
The door remains locked until someone empowered to do so gives the 
user the key. 
One might justifiably question whether it is correct to attach the 
label "fair use" to uses that are authorized by the copyright holder or 
its designee. In the offline domain, fair use and permission are, if not 
antagonistic, at least mutually exclusive. The copyright owner's per-
mission eliminates the need to resort to the fair use doctrine. Con-
versely, the fair use doctrine protects fair uses not only where the 
copyright owner's permission was never sought, but also where per-
mission has been sought and refused. Can any DRM system that 
makes authorization by an outside party the sine qua non of access 
truly protect what the law would recognize to be fair uses? 
A possible answer to this objection has already been hinted at in 
the prior discussion of granting the power to authorize fair uses of 
DRM-protected works to parties other than the copyright holder. 157 If 
we conceptualize fair uses as a set of permissions granted by the gov-
ernment that override any wishes of the copyright owner to the con-
trary,158 and we effectuate that conception by empowering a 
government agency to approve requested fair uses without the copy-
right owner's involvement,159 could such a system not protect at least 
some uses that the law would undoubtedly recognize as fair? 
Granting a disinterested party, such as the government, the au-
thority to authorize requested fair uses of DRM-protected digital con-
tent certainly eliminates one of the possible outcomes distinguishing 
fair use in the digital domain from fair use in the offline world: 
156. See generally supra note 100 and accompanying text (providing an earlier critique 
of the "deny by default" regime). 
157. See supra notes 130-39 and accompanying text. 
158. See Fox & LaMacchia, supra note 95, at 63. 
159. See Burk & Cohen, supra note 104, at 66-67. 
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namely, the risk that a copyright holder's disapproval will always pre-
vent a desired use. To match conditions in the offline world, a copy-
right holder must be legally (and technologically) powerless to 
prevent fair uses in the digital domain. Giving the final say to an in-
dependent licensing authority, to the extent that it prevents such a 
copyright holder veto, is a way to at least partly mimic the characteris-
tics of the offline world in a DRM-protected digital realm. 
Yet this answer does not address all of the objections to a permis-
sion-based DRM mechanism. In the world of offline media, a user 
seeking to engage in a fair use of a copyrighted work does not need 
advance permission from anyone. External decisionmakers become 
involved, if at all, only ex post. As a matter of process, the exercise of 
fair use rights in the offline world initially depends solely on the 
user's unilateral act. The user's conduct may, to the extent that it be-
comes known, be scrutinized after the fact for its compliance with the 
law, but nobody (including the copyright holder and the government) 
is entitled to advance notice or an opportunity to prevent the use from 
occurring. 160 Any DRM mechanism that leaves the ultimate decision 
whether a given fair use can occur in the hands of parties other than 
users themselves, accordingly, departs from the process of fair use as 
it occurs in the offline domain. 
2. Permission and Privacy 
A related objection concerns the issue of user privacy in DRM 
mechanisms that require approval from an outside licensing authority. 
Although a hybrid system combining local and remote authorization 
mechanisms may supply users with some privacy protection, this pro-
tection may be more theoretical than real once we consider which re-
quested uses will most likely require the user to seek outside 
authorization. 
In a remote authorization DRM mechanism, every requested use 
of protected digital content must be authorized by some remote licens-
ing authority, and concerns about user privacy apply with full force. 
Hybrid DRM mechanisms partly assuage these privacy concerns by 
"pre-approving" a subset of recognized fair uses. That is to say, some 
types of fair uses are hard-coded into the content and may be exer-
cised without requesting external authorization (and therefore without 
disclosing the desired use to the licensing authority). 
Even in such a hybrid system, however, the uses most likely to 
need external authorization are those most difficult to foresee and re-
duce to code. These, in turn, may be those uses that are "closest to the 
160. See Erickson & Mulligan. supra note 102. at 992-93 (discussing differing incentives 
provided in a system in which policy enforcement occurs before. rather than after. a user 
engages in a putative fair use of copyrighted content). 
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line," in which the various contextual factors play the strongest role. 
Quoting excerpts from the core of a controversial work, possibly 
thereby dampening demand for the work,161 is one example of a use 
that might fall sufficiently close to the line of fairness to require the 
careful balancing of factors that can be achieved, if at all, only by an 
external decisionmaker. 
It is precisely in such circumstances, however, that concerns 
about preserving user privacy are most prevalent. Thus, although hy-
brid DRM systems purportedly improve on pure remote authorization 
systems by restoring a domain for anonymous fair uses, the uses that 
will continue to require outside authorization are precisely those in 
h· h b d" 162 W IC concerns a out ero mg user pnvacy are strongest. 
The baseline of fair use in the offline world accommodates user 
privacy - typical fair uses occur essentially anonymously. Remote 
authorization DRM mechanisms ignore user anonymity, and hybrid 
systems may provide it only in those circumstances in which it is of 
lesser concern. In departing from the ideal of anonymous fair use, 
even hybrid DRM mechanisms aimed at providing an avenue for us-
ers to pursue fair uses fail to capture crucial characteristics of fair use 
in the offline world. 
IV. STRENGTHENING PROTECTIONS FOR FAIR USE RIGHTS IN 
DRM 
Although many observers have recognized the need for DRM 
mechanisms to include copyright exceptions such as fair use, both 
existing and proposed DRM systems poorly implement such excep-
tions. While some have concluded that working to develop techno-
logical protections for fair use is a futile endeavor,163 I believe it may 
be worthwhile. 
The flaw in the conclusion that DRM cannot accommodate fair 
use is an unduly hasty inductive leap from the specific (the impossi-
bility of modeling the substance of fair use law in machine-
administrable form) to the general (the supposed impossibility of pro-
tecting fair use at all in DRM systems). The foreclosure of one avenue 
for protecting fair use, however, does not imply that all avenues are 
likewise foreclosed, but only that design principles other than the 
creation of a perfect "judge on a chip" must be explored. 164 Shifting 
161. Cf Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 569 (1985) 
(holding that quoting a 300-word excerpt from the core of an unpublished work was not fair 
use). 
162. See infra Part IV.B.2. 
163. See. e.g., Dan L. Burk, Legal and Technical Standards in Digital Rights Manage-
ment Technology, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 537, 550 (2005). 
164. Stefan Bechtold has chided DRM critics for paying insufficient attention to the evo-
lution of "dynamic DRM" tools that may protect the rights of both copyright holders and 
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the focus to the protection of the process of fair use - the use of 
copyrighted content by individuals based merely on an exercise of 
their own volition, subject to scrutiny, if at all, only after the fact-
represents one such alternative. 
A. Design Principles 
The literature on technological protections for fair use provides a 
number of thoughtful suggestions concerning how best to implement 
copyright exceptions. 
1. Allowing Users to "Challenge the Code" 
Erickson and Mulligan recognize the possibility that a DRM 
mechanism mifht accept some input from end users in the authoriza-
tion process. 16 Their discussion, however, is comparatively cursory, 
and seems to be offered more as a remark in passing than as a sub-
stantial proposal for future reform: 
In this conventional view of the trusted system, the 
code becomes the ultimate arbiter; there are typically 
no technical provisions that allow the individual to 
disagree with the system's determination, regardless 
of whether the user may legally be in the right .... 
Policy-enforcement systems that accommodate 
variable use requests from individuals could provide 
those users with a limited ability to "challenge the 
code," in the sense that they could request authoriza-
tions for controlled actions for reasons other than 
purchase. In extreme cases, these requests might 
even deliver to individuals technical capabilities not 
users alike. See Bechtold, slipra note 6, at 602-05; see also id. at 602 ("Nothing in the 'na-
ture' of DRM requires that DRM be only used for restricting access to protected content or 
suppressing fair use privileges."), 604 (describing ongoing research in rights expression 
languages "able to manage transformative uses, overlapping innovation, and the creation of 
derivative works in a fine-grained way"). Dan Burk believes Bechtold's "assessment of 
future DRM is unduly rosy" in view of "the inability of DRM to accommodate legal stan-
dards." Burk, slipra note 163, at 550 n.60. Bechtold, it seems to me, has the better of this 
argument. Bechtold's argument builds upon research aimed at expanding the technological 
capabilities of parties other than the original content holder to assert their own rights over 
the protected content. What makes that research promising is that it does not seek to "ac-
commodate legal standards" in DRM, but instead aims to create DRM technologies that do 
not make the vagueness of governing legal standards outcome-determinative. The impossi-
bility of creating a "judge on a chip," programmed with full knowledge of the substantive 
law offair use, simply means that effective protections for fair use rights in DRM must take 
a different form - a prospect that Bechtold recognizes but Burk ignores. 
165. Erickson & Mulligan, sllpra note 102, at 995. 
HeinOnline -- 20 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 90 2006-2007
90 Harvard Journal of Law & Technology 
previously installed in content-handling compo-
nents. 166 
[Vol. 20 
Having raised the prospect that an external authority's decision to 
deny permission might not be the final word on the question, Erickson 
and Mulligan do not develop the idea further or explore how it might 
be implemented in practice. Nevertheless, even the brief excerpt 
quoted above includes a number of important observations that may 
supply useful guidance when attempting to design a DRM mechanism 
that incorporates strong protections for fair use rights. 
First, Erickson and Mulligan hint at a DRM mechanism that, 
unlike virtually all the examples collected in Part III, would foster an 
ongoing dialogue between users and administrators of the DRM sys-
tem, along with possible input from outside parties, rather than a one-
shot request-and-response system for obtaining permissions to use 
digital works. 167 Erickson and Mulligan raise the possibility that a 
denial of a requested use (or even a grant conditioned upon compli-
ance with requirements a user finds too onerous) could be subjected to 
further review inside or outside the DRM system. 168 Although the 
authors do not discuss the type of outside review that would be appro-
priate or how it could be effectuated, their proposal nevertheless hints 
at a possible opening-up of DRM mechanisms that are ordinarily con-
sidered closed and self-contained. 
Second, the excerpt quoted above recognizes a potential conse-
quence of increased user empowerment for the design of DRM soft-
ware. The software that implements the DRM system may need to be 
modular and extensible in design, accommodating components that 
permit unrestricted playback and duplication where such uses have 
been deemed fair. Indeed, because in some circumstances fair use 
permits duplication of an entire work,169 software may need to be en-
gineered so as to allow unfettered duplication in those circumstances. 
As discussed in Part V below, this requirement may have substantial 
implications for the political feasibility of the adoption of any DRM 
mechanism engineered to accommodate fair use rights. 
166. Id. at 994-95. 
167.1d. at 995. 
168.1d. 
169. See, e.g., Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 456 (1984) 
(home taping of complete television broadcasts for purpose of "time shifting" held fair use). 
Entertainment industry attorneys recently conceded before the Supreme Court that copying 
a complete song from an audio CD to an MP3 player was noninfringing. Transcript of Oral 
Argument at 12, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005) 
(No. 04-480); accord Recording Industry Ass'n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc., 
180 F.3d \072, 1079 (9th Cir. 1999) (describing copying MP3 files from one's own CDs to 
portable digital music player as "paradigmatic noncommercial personal use"). But cf 
FISHER, supra note 4, at 99-100, 117-19 (discussing court findings in earlier cases that 
"ripping" one's own audio CDs was not fair use). 
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2. Revising XML-Based Rights Expression Languages 
Another paper co-authored by Professor Mulligan imagines what 
technological alterations of existing DRM designs would be necessary 
to improve protections for fair use. 170 Mulligan and Burstein aim to tie 
their discussion closely to current-generation DRM technologies by 
focusing their attention on the XrML language.17I To improve protec-
tions for fair use, Mulligan and Burstein suggest changing current 
RELs, including XrML itself, to make it easier to express context-
dependent policies such as fair use, and adding a new messaging pro-
tocol to XrML that would allow end users to assert rights over content 
. h' . 172 In t elr possessIon. 
Mulligan and Burstein begin by highlighting several respects in 
which XrML and other current-generation RELs fail to capture limita-
tions on copyright holders' exclusive rights under federal copyright 
law. Although the Copyright Act includes many limitations on copy-
right holders' exclusive rights, "[m]achine-readable rules that control 
access to digital works could inhibit, restrict, or altogether prevent 
many legally authorized uses."I73 The obvious risk is that, particularly 
for content offered only in DRM-protected digital form, "these ma-
chine-readable rule sets ... could supplant copyright law.,,174 
Beyond the express copyright exceptions, Mulligan and Burstein 
also note that "real space norms," not expressly stated in the statutory 
text, "have developed around the use of copyrighted works.,,175 For 
example, "the private use of copyrighted materials" remains "essen-
tially unregulated.,,176 Where such uses are at issue, copyright holders 
traditionally have not been thought to enjoy any right "to require 
readers, viewers, or listeners to seek authorization before using a work 
privately."I77 This historical practice, while not expressly protected by 
the Copyright Act, nevertheless underlies an expectation of privacy in 
personal uses of copyrighted works. The authors note that the express 
copyright exceptions and the social norm of private use establish an 
important baseline for the use of copyrighted works which most DRM 
mechanisms do not meet: 
The evolution of fair use depends on, and the exer-
cise of exceptions to copyright presupposes that, us-
ers may determine for themselves whether to seek 
170. Mulligan & Burstein, supra note 39. 
171. Id. at 138 n.l; see also supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text. 
172. Mulligan & Burstein, supra note 39, at 138. 
173.1d. at 138. 
174.1d. 
175.1d. at 139. 
176.1d. 
177. Id. 
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"permission" for a given use. The Copyright Act 
provides a framework that allows "rights" to flow 
from several sources - the owner of the object (or 
copyright holder), a third party (including the gov-
ernment), and the user. 178 
[Vol. 20 
Most current DRM technologies invert this presupposition: DRM al-
lows the copyright holder to compel the user to seek permission for 
any requested use, and to deny the use entirely if the user's permission 
request fails (assuming that the DRM system is engineered to accom-
modate such requests at all). As Mulligan and Burstein write, "com-
mon RELs take the exclusive rights of copyright as an unqualified 
baseline and then provide the means for rights holders to make the 
work available under issuer-defined access models.,,179 
The authors suggest several approaches for rectifying the short-
comings of current DRM systems. First, they would extend the vo-
cabulary of rights that can be described in XrML, allowing exceptions 
to copyright holders' exclusive rights to be described. Put another 
way, Mulligan and Burstein aim to allow users' rights, not merely 
copyright holders' rights, to be described in XrML in machine-
interpretable form, so that "[t]he user's claim of right would provide 
the essential information for a usage-rights issuing agency to give the 
user the technical capability to use the work in a particular way.,,180 
This suggested extension of the vocabulary in which rights are 
expressed suggests a second, more far-reaching, change. Like most 
RELs, XrML assumes "a top-down, unidirectional flow of rights.,,181 
This "assumption of a one-way expression of rights," however, has 
produced recognizable "deficiencies in the RELs that are currently 
available.,,182 To remedy these deficiencies, Mulligan and Burstein 
suggest replacing XrML's messaging layer with a new Rights Mes-
saging Protocol ("RMP") that would allow "bi-directional exchanges" 
of rights information. 183 By allowing the assertion of rights in a bot-
tom-up fashion, the authors' proposed new RMP would effectuate 
users' practical ability to use the copyright exceptions enacted for 
h . b fi 184 t elr ene It. 
178.1d. (emphasis added). 
179.!d. 
180.!d. at 141. 
181.!d. at 140. 
182.1d. at 141. 
183.!d. 
184. As Mulligan and Berstein explain: 
At a minimum, recipients of works must have the ability to assert their rights 
as recognized under copyright law, and have these assertions reflected in their 
ability to use the work. Extending an REL to support a broader range of 
statements that reflect current law is, however, insufficient. The [RMPjlayer 
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Mulligan and Burstein's proposal displays remarkable sensitivity 
to concerns about user anonymity and privacy. Although Mulligan 
and Burstein would provide every user with the tools necessary to 
assert fair use rights over DRM-protected digital content, they would 
not mandate an express assertion of rights in every instance. Their 
proposal, instead, contemplates that DRM systems should allow a 
wider range of default positions and move away from the "c1osed-
universe" approach in which every use not expressly authorized is 
deemed to be wrongful. One of the major problems of existing RELs 
such as XrML is that they do not make fair use a default right of the 
license. 185 Their proposal would remedy this shortcoming by substi-
tuting a series of default rights, each geared towards a particular me-
dium, in place of XrML's "one-size-fits-all" approach, which is 
purposefully agnostic as to the type of media being protected. 186 Dif-
ferent types of media would be subject to different defaults, not all of 
which would require users to make an express assertion of rights be-
fore being able to use the work in one of the specified ways. J87 Mulli-
gan and Burstein provide an example using specific proposed tags 
fromXrML: 
... if a Work is a MusicalAlbum, the default interpre-
tation of the License must be that the Princi-
pal - the music critic, who bought the album - must 
be able to play the album without restriction, and to copy 
arbitrary parts of the album. This suggests that a concrete 
Work would impose certain default Rights, which 
would be granted by a given kind of concrete Work. In 
the case of a MusicalAlbum, this would include 
"Play," "Rewind," "Seek," and "Excerpt" 
or "Copy" Rights. Similar default Rights can be 
specified for different kinds of Works. 188 
In addition, Mulligan and Burstein would mandate a series of pro-
tections to ensure that their proposed DRM system does not become a 
tool for user surveillance by copyright owners. Again, the authors take 
offline user norms that have developed under federal copyright law as 
their baseline. Those norms include robust protections for user pri-
vacy, partly for the simple reason that most fair uses of non-DRM-
[d. 
must also be extended to accommodate both the downstream and upstream as-
sertion of rights. 
185. See id. at 145. 
186. See id. at 146. 
187. [d. 
188. [d. For clarity, I have kept their original typeface to distinguish the XrML tags. 
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protected content are undetectable and effectively anonymous. 189 To 
reflect the realities of the offline world, the DRM "processing system 
should make no inquiry into the extent or frequency with which the 
user seeks to exercise the rights.,,19o To minimize the risk that copy-
right owners will compel users to bargain (and pay) for rights that the 
fair use doctrine makes freely available, the authors' DRM system 
would be designed not to record the types of personally identifying 
information on which such a bargaining approach would depend. 191 
3. LicenseScript 
A group of academic and industry authors from the Netherlands 
has suggested a novel approach that would implement a number of 
Mulligan and Burstein's suggestions. Rather than seeking to improve 
the recognition of fair use and other copyright limitations in existing 
RELs such as XrML, this group has instead designed its own com-
puter language for DRM systems. Their language, LicenseScript,192 is 
based on the high-level, general-purpose programming language 
Prolog. 193 
LicenseScript aims to overcome several failings of XML-based 
languages like XrML. First, XrML can be an extremely verbose 
means of expressing rights, particularly when attempting to describe 
the complex conditional rights structures that are common in real-
world applications. 194 As the designers of LicenseScript put it, 
189.ld. 
190.ld at 147. 
191. See id. at 14~8. This design feature is particularly desirable insofar as it follows 
Professor Cohen's admonition against collecting user-identifying information except where 
such information is required for functional purposes. See infra note 228 and accompanying 
text. 
192. See Cheun Ngen Chong et a\., LicenseScript: A Novel Digital Rights Language and 
its Semantics, http://purl.org/utwente/fidlI152 (2003) [hereinafter Cheun et a\., 
LicenseScriptj. 
193. Prolog is frequently deployed in artificial intelligence applications and is generally 
known for its comparatively simple and lucid syntax. See generally Wikipedia, Prolog, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prolog(as of Nov. 17,2006,00:24 GMT). 
194. See, e.g., XrML Example Use Cases, supra note 102, at 8-12, 31-40. The authors' 
LicenseScript language enjoys a relatively compact syntax. Indeed, to drive home the 
strength, flexibility, and concision of their language, some of the same authors produced a 
much longer paper in which they rewrote nearly all of the basic usage examples supplied 
with XrML and the Open Digital Rights Language ("ODRL") in LicenseScript. In general, 
the LicenseScript examples are substantially shorter than their counterparts in the XML-
based RELs, and take full advantage of LicenseScript's license-rewriting capabilities. See 
Cheun Ngen Chong et a\., Comparing Logic-Based and XML-Based Rights Expression 
Languages, in ON THE MOVE TO MEANINGFUL INTERNET SYSTEMS 2003: OTM 2003 
WORKSHOPS, LNCS 2889, at 779 (Robert Meersman & Zahir Tari eds., 2003). An even 
lengthier version of the article, including appendices containing many more examples of 
XrML code and the corresponding implementation in LicenseScript, is available on the 
authors' web site. See Cheun Ngen Chong et a\., Comparing Logic-Based and XML-Based 
Rights Expression Languages, http://purl.org/utwente/fidIl138 (last visited Nov. 17, 2006). 
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XrML's "syntax is complicated and obscure when the conditions of 
use become complex.,,195 Second, XrML has been criticized as overly 
dependent on human inferences and interpretations to give content to 
many of the terms used in license grants (such as "play," in the con-
text of an entertainment work).196 Finally, because of their limited 
capability to accommodate contextual data, XML-based RELs "can-
not express many useful copyright laws.,,197 
A technical description of the syntax and operation of 
LicenseScript lies beyond the scope of this Article. For purposes of 
the present inquiry, however, the most provocative work by the 
authors of LicenseScript is their essay, Approximating Fair Use in 
LicenseScript. 198 In this work, the authors examine whether 
LicenseScript can accommodate provisions reasonably analogous to 
fair use law as it exists in the United States. Their work is particularly 
interesting in that it draws upon both scientific and legal scholarship 
as inspiration for its novel DRM proposal. Thus, for instance, the 
authors approvingly note Mulligan and Burstein's summary of the 
limitations of XML-based RELs in accommodating fair uses. 199 The 
authors next ask whether LicenseScript can succeed where XML-
based RELs have failed. Their answer is a qualified "yes." 
The authors propose a two-part approach to approximating fair 
use rights in LicenseScript: "(1) Rights assertion: to allow the user 
[to] assert new fair use-compliant rights in addition to the rights dic-
tated by the license; and (2) Audit logging: to keep a record of the 
rights asserted by the user and [to keep track ot] the copies of the li-
censes created.,,20o This two-part approach, in the authors' view, 
evenhandedly accommodates the interests of both digital content users 
and copyright holders: "on one hand, the users can freely exercise 
their statutory rights; on the other hand, the cop~right owner can track 
the source of possible copyright infringement." 01 Allowing users "to 
assert new rights contributes to fair use because [they] can express 
their rights according to their will, in addition to the rights granted by 
the copyright owner.,,202 
195. Cheun et aI., LicenseScript, supra note 192, at I. 
196. In XML-based RELs, "the meaning of licenses relies heavily on ... human interpre-
tation." Id. 
197.1d. (citation omitted). 
198. Cheun Ngen Chong et aI., Approximating Fair Use in LicenseScript, in DIGITAL 
LIBRARIES: TECHNOLOGY AND MANAGEMENT OF INDIGENOUS KNOWLEDGE FOR GLOBAL 
ACCESS, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 6TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ASIAN DIGITAL 
LIBRARIES, LNCS 2911, at 432 (Tengku M.T. Sembok et al. eds., 2003), available at 
http://purl.org!utwente/fid/I136 [hereinafter Cheun et aI., Approximating Fair Use]. 
199.1d. at 433 (citing Mulligan & Burstein, supra note 39). 
200. Id. (citation omitted). 
20 I. Id. at 434. 
202.1d. 
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Under this proposal, digital content protected by a DRM mecha-
nism implemented in LicenseScript would convey to the user permis-
sions typical of DRM mechanisms in general, such as the rights to 
play back, duplicate, excerpt, or print a work. In addition, the licensor 
would encode a new right - "assert" - in the clauses of the license 
and the accompanying playback rules. In the authors' examples, a 
user would be required to supply four pieces of information to exer-
cise this new "assert" right: (1) the user's identity, (2) the right as-
serted, (3) the date of the assertion, and (4) the purpose for which the 
content is sought to be used?03 The "purpose" item must be chosen 
from a list of six possibilities encoded with the license: criticism, 
. d . h I h' h 204 comment, news reportmg, e ucatlOn, sc 0 ars IP, or researc . 
The LicenseScript proposal includes two mechanisms designed to 
protect copyright holders against abuse of users' powers to assert new 
rights over the protected content. The first is, essentially, a conscious 
abandonment of user privacy: every assertion of a fair use right would 
be recorded in the license along with the user's identity, the date, and 
the proffered reason for the use. This creates an audit trail of asserted 
fair uses that the copyright holder may ultimately be able to inspect. 
The possible risk of future discovery, the authors assume, will give 
users an adequate incentive to confine their assertion of new rights to 
circumstances that truly constitute fair uses of the protected work?05 
The second mechanism protecting copyright holders is subtler, 
but likely more directly effective, than the power to police asserted 
fair uses through the audit trail. Although the new "assert" right em-
powers users to alter the supplied license clauses to give themselves 
new rights not included in the original license, the asserted rights 
must themselves be reflected in the license rules. A user cannot effec-
tively assert a right to print the document, for example, if the content 
provider has not programmed the license rules to recognize "printing" 
as a right. The ultimate choice of which capabilities will be recog-
nized and effectuated thus remains with the originallicensor.206 
203.ld. at 435. 
204. Id. at 439. 
205. LicenseScript's authors are, perhaps purposefully, vague on the possible mecha-
nisms by which copyright holders could monitor the uses of protected works. The license 
rules as given in their examples do not, for example, include any provision for automatically 
forwarding to the original licensor a copy of any modified licenses created as a result of 
users' assertions of new rights. The audit trail of users' assertions of fair use rights will 
travel with the accompanying content, however, such that if the content is subsequently sold 
or transferred from one user to another, the audit trail written in the license bindings will 
remain intact and readable. See id. at 44~1. This feature of the authors' approach, of 
course, potentially leaves the history of user rights assertions subject to possible inspection 
not only by the copyright holder, but also by other users. 
206. See id. at 442 ("Our approach ... allows user[s] to freely express their rights. At the 
same time, the copyright owner may control the user's fair use actions to the extent confined 
by the rules."). 
HeinOnline -- 20 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 97 2006-2007
No. I] Digital Rights Management and the Process of Fair Use 97 
This latter flaw suggests more generally that LicenseScript, 
despite its undeniable promise, ultimately represents a failed attempt 
to model adequate protections for fair use in DRM. To be sure, 
LicenseScript improves in some respects upon the protections for fair 
use that exist under Burk and Cohen's proposed mixed fair use 
infrastructure207 insofar as LicenseScript allows users to assert rights 
not granted in the original license and does not require asserted fair 
uses to be disclosed in advance for approval by the license issuer. It is 
also strongly to LicenseScript's credit that it does not allow the 
copyright holder to capture an additional royalty as a condition for 
allowing a user to engage in a fair use of the protected work. 
Nevertheless, lingering flaws in LicenseScript's design, at least as 
described by its authors, suggest that it may prove inadequate for 
protecting fair use rights in DRM. 
LicenseScript's primary failing is that, contrary to its stated aims, 
it actually falls well short of truly permitting users to assert new rights 
in content they have purchased. A closer look at what LicenseScript 
actually requires reveals that content owners retain strong control over 
the rights that may be recognized and asserted by users within the 
system. 
I previously criticized Burk and Cohen's proposed mixed fair use 
infrastructure for implicitly resting on the same "deny by default" 
assumption that makes local and remote authorization mechanisms 
poor protectors of fair use.20S The solution to that design problem has 
been well stated by Mulligan and Burstein:209 DRM designers must 
grant parties other than the copyright holder, including users them-
selves, a voice in the authorization mechanism, which must be de-
signed not to leave the copyright holder with the final say.2lO 
Although LicenseScript's authors cite Mulligan and Burstein's re-
search,211 they do not heed its insights. LicenseScript, despite its in-
novations, continues to exhibit the same "deny by default" design that 
has made prior DRM implementations poor protectors of fair use 
rights. 
LicenseScript's authors repeatedly conceptualize the assertion of 
new rights as something the copyright holder may permit, at its elec-
tion, under circumstances of its choosing. Even their attempt to model 
fair use rights in LicenseScript leaves critical matters under the ex-
press control of the original license issuer. The issuer specifies, in its 
LicenseScript rules, which rights a user may assert - that is to say, 
which types of access the player application or other access mecha-
207. See generally supra Part III.e. 
208. See supra Part 111.0.1. 
209. See Mulligan & Burstein, supra note 39. 
210. See supra Part IV.A.2. 
211. See supra note 199 and accompanying text. 
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nism will recognize as the proper object of an "assert" command?'2 
The license issuer is further allowed to delimit the permissible pur-
poses for which a user may assert a right to make use of the protected 
content.213 Tellingly, the purposes enumerated in the authors' article 
omit any reference to certain types offair use (such as parody) that are 
clearly established under copyright law but to which copyright holders 
are very likely to object.214 Although this may be a simple oversight 
on the authors' part, and not fatal to the creation of parodies of works 
protected by a LicenseScript-based DRM mechanism,215 the omission 
of a category of permissions that a copyright holder would be disin-
clined to grant nevertheless highlights the inherent limitations of any 
system that places so much control in the hands of the copyright 
holder. 
LicenseScript is also subject to a strong privacy objection regard-
ing its audit trail. Every time a user asserts a fair use right over a pro-
tected work, LicenseScript records several details of the assertion 
(including the user's identity) in the license bindings, which thereafter 
remain attached to the content even if it is transferred to another user 
or returned to the copyright holder. There are at least two possible 
objections to this approach. 
First, even if we assume that copyright holders need the informa-
tion collected in the LicenseScript audit trail to police users' rights 
assertions for possible abuse, that hardly justifies sharing the same 
information with fellow users. By encoding the details of any asserted 
fair use in the license bindings, however, LicenseScript assures that a 
record of the asserted use will follow the content wherever it goes. 
This needless exposure of one user's identifying data to others could 
have been avoided if, for example, LicenseScript transmitted records 
of rights assertions directly to the copyright holder (or, preferably, to a 
212. See Cheun et aI., Approximating Fair Use, supra note 198, at 439-40. 
213.1d. at 439. 
214. Cf supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text. 
215. A user could, for example, simply label its use with one of the other categories enu-
merated in the article, such as criticism or comment. See supra note 204 and accompanying 
text. This would, in turn, reduce the precision of the license's audit trail, but unless the 
content owner ultimately viewed both the license audit trail and the resulting parody, it 
would be none the wiser. 
The idea of recording false information in the LicenseScript audit trail where necessary 
to conform the user's assertion of fair use rights to the more limited subset of permissible 
uses is analogous to the so-called "owner override" proposal. Advanced by the Electronic 
Frontier Foundation ("EFF"), the "owner override" proposal would permit users to supply 
false or misleading information to purveyors of "trusted computing" systems where neces-
sary to maintain the level of control users have customarily exercised over their own pes. 
See Seth Schoen, Trusted Computing: Promise and Risk, 12 (2003), http://www.eff.orgl 
Infrastructure/trusted_computingl20031001_tc.pdf. Although owner override is too blunt a 
tool to substitute effectively for a DRM mechanism engineered to preserve fair use rights, it 
is difficult to quarrel with the EFF's conclusion that such measures can be appropriate 
where unilateral action by outside parties would otherwise strip users' control over comput-
ing devices they have purchased. 
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disinterested intermediary) rather than writing them into the license 
bindings. 
Second, LicenseScript's rights assertion mechanism potentially 
supplies copyright holders with a great deal of information about fair 
users, including their identity, the date and type of use, and the 
claimed justification, at a time when the copyright holder has no col-
orable entitlement to know that information. LicenseScript obliges 
innocent users operating within the confines of the fair use doctrine to 
surrender their anonymity as a condition of exercising their statutory 
rights. In this respect, LicenseScript disadvantages users of digital 
content; fair users in the offline world may remain effectively anony-
mous unless and until a copyright holder acquires reason to investi-
gate. 
B. Designing DRM to Protect Fair Use 
Although prevalent DRM technologies currently do a poor job of 
protecting user rights to engage in fair uses of the underlying works, 
some commentators have suggested that these rights may be ade-
quately protected by modifying the DRM system to allow user par-
ticipation in the authorization process.216 LicenseScript, despite its 
shortcomings, demonstrates that a system engineered to provide such 
user participation is technologically feasible.217 It may be possible to 
devise a DRM mechanism that adequately protects fair use and user 
privacy without requiring copyright holders to relinquish the legiti-
mate protections against mass infringement. The discussion that fol-
lows aims to provide one possible blueprint for such a system. The 
basic principles of the design derive from LicenseScript's model, with 
modifications aimed at overcoming some of its shortcomings. 
I. Asserting User Rights and Audit Logging 
LicenseScript's designers correctly perceived that fair uses ordi-
narily rest upon the exercise of a user's volition alone. Any DRM sys-
tem designed to preserve the range of fair uses that exist in the offline 
world must, accordingly, leave some space in which users may exer-
cise their fair use rights without needing to petition any external au-
thority for permission. LicenseScript aims to provide such a space, but 
subordinates user rights to the demands of copyright-holder control. If 
a DRM system is to approximate the freedoms users enjoy in the off-
line world, it must include a mechanism for users to unilaterally assert 
fair use rights, without obtaining advance permission from any out-
216. See supra Parts IV.A.I, IV.A.2. 
217. See supra Part IV.AJ. 
HeinOnline -- 20 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 100 2006-2007
100 Harvard Journal of Law & Technology [Vol. 20 
side authority. This design principle suggests some alterations to the 
LicenseScript approach. 
First, a DRM system must empower users to assert fair use rights 
irrespective of the contrary wishes of the copyright holder or any third 
party. A design, such as LicenseScript or Burk and Cohen's mixed 
fair use infrastructure,218 which leaves an outside authority with the 
final say whether to allow users to exercise their rights, is ultimately 
incompatible with a mandate to preserve fair use. Therefore, one key 
component of any DRM system engineered for fair use will be the 
removal of copyright holders' or other outside parties' ability to pre-
vent users from partaking in putatively fair uses of the protected con-
tent. This principle has consequences both for the law and for the 
design of DRM systems.219 It suffices here to note that those compo-
nents of the LicenseScript design that require the original license is-
suer to authorize the permitted usage before a user becomes 
empowered to engage in a fair use must be discarded. 
Second, a DRM system should not allow the copyright holder to 
determine which fair uses will be permitted or which purposes the 
DRM mechanism will recognize as legitimate. What copyright hold-
ers cannot deny wholesale, they should not be able to deny piecemeal. 
A distinct failing of LicenseScript is its enumeration of exactly six 
purposes for which a user will be allowed to assert fair use rights. 
This constraint not only overlooks other settled categories recognized 
in fair use law,220 it also cannot be squared with the text of the fair use 
statute, which lists illustrative but non-exclusive categories of fair 
use.221 To match the experience of fair use in the offline world, the 
user must retain the freedom to determine not only whether, but also 
for what purpose, to assert a fair use right over DRM-protected con-
tent. 
A rights assertion mechanism could provide users with an addi-
tional avenue to obtain access to a work, supplementing local or re-
mote authorization mechanisms or hybrids thereof. Implementing a 
rights assertion capability as a supplement to a hybrid DRM mecha-
nism of the sort championed by Professors Burk and Cohen,m for 
example, may yield a desirable combination of advantages for users 
while maintaining sufficient protections for copyright holders so as 
not to provoke their opposition. 
How would such a system work in practice? First, a range of pre-
authorized fair uses, possibly modeled on existing safe harbors in the 
218. See supra Part Ill.c.l. 
219. See infra Parts V.C, V.D. 
220. See supra note 214 and accompanying text. 
221. See supra note 3 1 and accompanying text. 
222. Burk & Cohen, supra note 104, at 65-70. 
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offline world,m could be encoded into the work or accompanying 
metadata. A user who wanted to engage in a non-preauthorized use 
could submit an authorization request to a remote license-issuing au-
thority (which, for the reasons previously explored,224 must be some-
one other than the copyright holder or its agent), supplying such 
contextual information as the system is engineered to accept. Upon 
approval of the user's request, the licensing authority would issue the 
digital keys necessary to effectuate the requested use. If, on the other 
hand, the licensing authority denied the request, or if the user judged 
the burden of applying to the license authority to be too great, the user 
would have still another option. The user could elect to "challenge the 
code,,225 and assert a right to engage in a fair use of the protected con-
tent. Faced with such an assertion of rights, a compliant player appli-
cation would be required to permit the use, although it may extract a 
quid pro quo from the user in the form of contextual information for 
recording in an audit trail. 226 
This system would essentially allow the user to decide whether 
the desirability of a clear ex ante authorization for the intended use 
outweighed the burdens and privacy implications of seeking such au-
thorization. Different users might see the issue quite differently. A 
textbook author might be highly motivated (or indeed, contractually 
bound) to secure express authorization directly from copyright holders 
for each piece of their content included in the textbook, rather than to 
simply assert fair use rights. This author might be indifferent to the 
223. Although the fair use section of the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000), includes 
only the four-factor "balancing test" that has been justifiably labeled impossible to auto-
mate, other copyright exceptions may be easier to encode. See, e.g., 17 U.S.c. § 108 (repro-
duction by libraries and archives), § 110 (multiple exceptions for public performance and 
display of copyrighted works in various types of institutions). Other default protections may 
be drawn from the mUltipartite "Agreement on Guidelines for Classroom Copying in Not-
For-Profit Educational Institutions" which appears in the legislative history of the 1976 
Copyright Act as a note to § 107. The "Guidelines" carve out a series of exceptions in fairly 
concrete terms that may not be difficult to reduce to code, even going so far as to state pre-
cise numbers of words or exact percentages of the original source material that may be used. 
The "Guidelines" are intended to describe uses that are clearly fair, without purporting to 
cast doubt on the fairness of uses more extensive than those described - that is to say, the 
"Guidelines" aim to describe a floor, not a ceiling, for fair use: "The purpose of the follow-
ing guidelines is to state the minimum and not the maximum standards of educational fair 
use under section 107 .... There may be instances in which copying which does not fall 
within the guidelines stated below may nonetheless be permitted under the criteria of fair 
use." H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 68 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5681. 
An initial set of hard-coded preauthorized uses designed by analogizing to the "Guidelines," 
then, may be particularly appropriate for a DRM system that does not take the hard-coded 
defaults as exclusive, but provides other avenues to permit users to engage in further uses. 
224. See supra notes 130-39 and accompanying text. 
225. See supra Part IV.A.1. 
226. The particular information that could be collected and the manner of its storage are 
issues with implications for user privacy, which will be taken up infra Part IV.B.2. The fact 
that the player program must be engineered to allow access to the content in the face of a 
user's assertion of fair use rights also has consequences for the design of media player 
hardware and software, which will be taken up infra Part V.c. 
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disclosure of identifying information that would accompany a request 
for such express authorization, and thus, the remote authorization 
mechanism might prove wholly satisfactory. Conversely, a reviewer 
who has been leaked a pre-release copy of a new musical album and 
who plans to pen an unfavorable online review, annotated with song 
excerpts, might be unwilling to wait for authorization and disinclined 
to sacrifice anonymity, perhaps for fear of jeopardizing relationships 
with industry sources. This user might instead bypass the authoriza-
tion process in favor of simply asserting fair use rights to excerpt por-
tions of the content. The point is simply that a DRM system 
engineered as described above leaves intact the user's choice whether 
to seek express authorization, and does so in precisely the same form 
that that choice takes in the offline world. 
2. Identity Escrow 
The proposal sketched out so far suffers from an obvious practical 
objection. If a user must be empowered to unilaterally assert a right to 
use DRM-protected content in any fashion the user wishes, and if the 
DRM system must be so designed as to accommodate such a request, 
can it still be said that the DRM mechanism is a DRM mechanism as 
that term is commonly understood? As so phrased, the question is a 
bit loaded; DRM mechanisms as "commonly understood" protect fair 
use poorly, and any effort to use DRM to legitimately limit copyright 
holders' exclusive rights will necessarily entail a break with past prac-
tice. Nevertheless, it is appropriate to ask how a mechanism that em-
powers users to do whatever they wish with content they have 
purchased, based solely on their own authority, differs operationally 
from the absence of any technological protection measure. Or, to put 
it slightly differently, does such a system provide to copyright owners 
any protection against widespread infringement by users determined 
to infringe? 
The answer is yes, up to a point. That point is actually fairly so-
licitous of copyright holder interests - far more so, indeed, than ex-
ists as a practical matter in the offline world. It is, however, a less 
extensive protection than the effective lockdown that current DRM 
implementations promise (even if they ultimately fail to deliver) to 
copyright holders. 
What differentiates a DRM system designed to protect fair use on 
the one hand from the absence of DRM on the other is the potential 
existence of a permanent record of user rights assertions. 
LicenseScript's authors refer to this record as the "audit trail," whose 
very name suggests policing users to ensure that their zeal to use 
copyrighted works does not devolve into unchecked infringement. 
This terminology seems tolerably apt, and I will continue to use it, 
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although as the ensuing discussion will reflect, my conception of the 
audit trail departs from LicenseScript's in some respects. 
Many observers have expressed concern about the capabilities of 
contemporary DRM systems to erode user privacy.227 Professor 
Cohen has suggested that DRM infrastructure be designed to mini-
mize the collection of user-identifying information.228 To avoid the 
risk that disclosure of a user's personal information will intrude upon 
the legitimate sphere of privacy that ordinarily surrounds personal 
uses of copyrighted works, DRM systems should not even collect 
such information except where indispensable to some instrumental 
function: 
Value-sensitive design for DRM also would investi-
gate methods of building in limits on monitoring and 
profiling of individual users. Because most busi-
nesses need to collect and retain some information 
about their customers to manage orders, payments, 
and deliveries, technological limits on data collection 
and use cannot fully substitute for other, human-
implemented safeguards. Nonetheless, DRM systems 
may be designed either to minimize or to maximize 
data collection, retention, extraction and use. To pre-
serve the intellectual privacy of information users, 
DRM design should incorporate minimization prin-
. I 229 ClP es. 
Professor Cohen's basic point is that merely because detailed user 
information can be collected by a DRM system, it does not follow that 
it should be. Instead, it is pertinent to ask at each stage of the process 
whether the collection of user data is justified in light of some instru-
mental aim. Collection and retention of more information than is nec-
essary heightens the risk to user privacy, and should be avoided for 
that reason alone.23o 
Assuming that some information must be collected in order for 
the DRM system to function, can sufficient protections be imple-
mented to prevent information collection from impairing user pri-
vacy? A recent article, provocatively titled Privacy-Preserving Digital 
Rights Management, aims to answer that question in the affirma-
227. See. e.g., Jonathan Zittrain, What the Publisher Can Teach the Patient: Intellectual 
Property and Privacy in an Era a/Trusted Privication, 52 STAN. L. REv. 1201, 1243-45 
(2000). 
228. Julie E. Cohen, DRM and Privacy, 18 BERKELEY TECH. LJ. 575, 612 (2003). 
229.!d. at 611-12 (footnote omitted). 
230. See supra notes 189-91 and accompanying text. 
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tive.231 The technical details of the proposal are beyond the scope of 
this essay, but its essential thrust may be grasped readily enough. At 
each stage of the interaction between a user and a license-issuing au-
thority in a DRM system, the parties interact not directly, but through 
pseudonymous intermediaries - essentially, digital certificates that 
are issued to facilitate a given interaction, but from which the user's 
identity cannot be deduced: 
In the basic privacy-preserving DRM ["P2DRM"] 
system, the real identity of the user is decoup\ed 
from identifiers which the user possesses in the sys-
tem. These identifiers, i.e. user pseudonyms ... are 
used to link a user. . . to content, thus allowing a 
user to access the content for which he bought the 
rights .... 
The basic privacy threat that P2DRM circumvents is 
the association of a user's real identity and content 
that the user owns, association which may happen 
with the use of personal licenses for content access. 
This also prevents that users are tracked while ac-
cessing the content.232 
The authors' description of how a user would interact with a li-
cense-issuing authority in this fashion is generic enough to be applied 
to any of the interactions that would be necessary to implement the 
various DRM mechanisms discussed above. The basic structure would 
resemble the following: 
I. A user purchases some type of identification de-
vice (perhaps a "smart card") from a retailer. Em-
bedded in this device is an encryption key pair 
consisting of a public key and a secret key.233 
2. User inquiries concerning the availability of vari-
ous content (or licenses in a DRM system of the type 
I have been describing) are conducted via an anony-
mous channel through which the parties can negoti-
231. Claudine Conrado et aI., Privacy-Preserving Digital Rights Management, in SECURE 
DATA MANAGEMENT: VLDB 2004 WORKSHOP, SDM 2004, LNCS 3178, at 83 (Willem 
Jonker & Milan Petkovic eds., 2004). 
232. Id. at 85. 
233. See generally Wikipedia, Public-key Cryptography, http://en.wikipedia.orglwiki/ 
Public-key _cryptography (as of Nov. 17,2006,00:49 GMT). 
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ate terms without the content provider learning the 
user's identity. 
3. If the parties agree to the terms of an exchange, 
the anonymous intermediary completes any required 
payment, and then supplies the content provider with 
the user's public key, which the content provider 
uses to encrypt the content (or license). The content 
provider then returns the encoded content to the 
anonymous intermediary, which in turn forwards it 
to the user. 
4. The user decodes and uses the supplied content 
with the secret key from the user's identification de-
vice.234 
This approach is not perfectly secure. The content provider does, 
as a result of the transaction, learn which public key is associated with 
a given request for the particular content. Because the public key was 
supplied to the content provider through the anonymous channel, 
however, the content provider does not learn the user's identity.235 
Another possibility, not discussed in the article, is that a particular 
request, even though conducted through an anonymous channel, will 
supply information sufficient to allow the content owner to deduce the 
requester's identity. Preventing a clever licensor from piecing together 
what is known of a given user request (perhaps concerning some spe-
cialized or idiosyncratic work that is of interest to a finite and known 
pool of potential users) and deducing the identity of the user behind 
the request is probably impossible, and the risk exists even under the 
authors' "privacy-preserving DRM" proposal. 
The authors go on to expand their proposal to address other sce-
narios, such as an anonymous transfer of a license from one user to 
another, and revocation of a license grant in which the licensor does 
not know the licensee's identity.236 Nevertheless, the basic point for 
234. See Conrado et aI., supra note 231, at 86-90. Certain steps from the authors' de-
scription of their process have been omitted in the interest of brevity, although at the possi-
ble risk of introducing ambiguity that is not present in the original. 
Another proposal that follows the same general format is available in Seki & Kameyama, 
supra note 20, at 4113-14. This proposal adds complexity to the design by encrypting each 
exchange of keys and content with one-time session keys that expire upon use. This is of-
fered as a way of reducing the risk that an eavesdropper situated in the network between the 
sender and the recipient could monitor the parties' encrypted communications and deduce 
the encryption scheme they are employing (the so-called "man in the middle attack"). The 
underlying structure of the proposal, however (transmittal of an anonymous public key that 
is then used to encrypt either the content or a separate key necessary for playback) is essen-
tially the same as in the Conrado et al. article. 
235. Conrado et aI., supra note 231, at 87. 
236.1d. at 90-93. 
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present purposes remains unchanged. User privacy is preserved at 
each stage of the process by barring disclosure of enough information 
to allow any participant to deduce which individual user is associated 
with a given public key. Indeed, the authors point out, deducing the 
user's identity from the public key ought to remain impossible even if 
all other participants in the system collude and share what information 
they possess about the portions of each transaction in which the user 
has engaged.237 
What lessons can be drawn from this model for the creation of a 
DRM system that is protective of both fair use and user privacy? Ac-
cepting for present purposes the need for an audit trail to discourage 
users from infringing copyrights, the foregoing examples nevertheless 
suggest ample room for improvement over the privacy-defeating de-
sign of LicenseScript. The basic design problem is an issue of con-
flicting imperatives: requiring some record of assertions of fair use 
rights so that users do not believe they are completely unsupervised, 
while minimizing the disclosure of user-identifying information to 
copyright holders. 
One approach would be to record in the audit trail various contex-
tual information about an asserted fair use except for the user's iden-
tity. The user's identity could instead be represented by the user's 
public key, as the public key substitutes for the user's identity for 
most interactions in the "privacy-preserving DRM" system. As Con-
rado et al. suggest, it should remain impracticable to deduce the user's 
identity from the public key (or, to be more precise, from the combi-
nation of the public key and the transactional information held by the 
other participants in the system).238 
A user who was perfectly confident that the content provider 
could never discover her identity would lack any obvious incentive to 
refrain from using the DRM system's rights assertion tools to infringe 
copyright. Accordingly, rather than being designed not to collect user 
identification information, a DRM system engineered for fair use 
could collect such information, but hold it in escrow, entirely separate 
from the audit trail. To the copyright holder's eyes, only a stream of 
digits (that is, the public key) would identify a party who had asserted 
fair use rights in DRM-protected digital content. If its review of the 
237.1d. at 97-99. The authors note that the distribution of information about the user and 
the transactions in which she engages should suffice to prevent discovery of the user's ac-
tual identity even if all the parties other than the user collude. The smart card issuer at Step 
I of the process outlined in the text, for example, does not know what key has been encoded 
on the card purchased by any user. The content provider at Step 2 of the process learns the 
connection between the user's public key number and the content the user has accessed (or 
the rights the user has acquired), but no other information. The intermediary knows the 
user's public key and which information or rights the user has accessed. But in theory, the 
critical connection - between the user's public key and the user's own identity - remains 
unknown to all parties except the user herself. 
238. Id. at 87. 
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audit trail gave reason to believe that substantial infringement was 
occurring, a copyright holder could secure the release of the user's 
actual identity from escrow, much as a copyright holder can now 
compel internet service providers to divulge the identities of users 
who are believed to be committing copyright infringement.239 The 
particulars of the identity release procedure need not be fully devel-
oped here; the point for present purposes is simply that an identity-
escrow scheme could satisfy copyright holders' needs to police abuses 
of the rights assertion framework that are detected within the audit 
trail while simultaneously guaranteeing user privacy in the ordinary 
operation of the system. 
3. Summary 
The combination of a robust rights assertion framework with the 
privacy-preserving characteristics of identity escrow could go a long 
way towards addressing the lingering concerns by effectively protect-
ing fair use in DRM. Unlike local authorization, remote authorization, 
and hybrid DRM mechanisms, a DRM system that empowers users to 
assert fair use rights to access protected content would prevent fair use 
from collapsing into authorized use, thereby preserving the viability 
of fair uses to which the copyright owner objects, just as in the offline 
world. Empowering rights assertion by users may also restore sponta-
neous fair uses. By withholding personally identifying information in 
ordinary operation, moreover, such a system would minimize the 
chilling effects that inevitably result when one is certain that one's 
identity and one's fair use will become known. 
The system also protects the needs of copyright holders through 
the mechanism of the audit trail - a form of protection that copyright 
holders do not enjoy in the offline world. The identity escrow provi-
sion protects copyright holders' interests in squelching abuses of the 
rights assertion system. Following a sufficient showing of possible 
infringement (based on the audit trail), the copyright holder would 
become entitled to pierce the veil of public-key pseudonymity and 
learn the user's identity. 
Earlier in this Article, I chose user experiences with fair use in the 
offline world as the benchmark against which to evaluate protections 
for fair use in DRM systems.240 My proposal improves upon the com-
peting proposals I have previously discussed, but it is not without 
flaws. The weakest point is the audit trail logging of information con-
cerning fair use rights assertions. Even if one accepts the necessity of 
that logging mechanism as a deterrent to abuses of the rights-assertion 
process, the audit trail nevertheless has no parallel in the offline 
239. See 17 U.S.C. § SI2(h)(2000). 
240. See supra Part II.A. 
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world.241 Users particularly sensitive to the risk of disclosure of iden-
tifying infonnation might find the identity escrow system an insuffi-
cient layer of protection, and thus not engage in precisely the types of 
uses the system is meant to foster. These are substantial concerns, and 
I do not mean to minimize them by noting that they are present in at 
least the same degree (and often, to a far greater degree) in the various 
predecessor proposals to which my alternative responds. Whether per-
fection as I have defined it is ultimately attainable or not, it is cer-
tainly possible to move closer to it than existing DRM systems have. 
To be sure, a system of the type outlined in this section promises 
a number of improvements over the status quo. But is it achievable? 
The answer to that question will require consideration of possible re-
fonns in areas as varied as law and software design, and it is to that 
final topic that I now tum. 
V. CHALLENGES FOR IMPLEMENTATION: HARNESSING THE 
MODALITIES OF REGULATORY CHANGE242 
Part IV.B sketched out a proposal that would increase protections 
for fair use rights in DRM technologies by empowering users to assert 
fair use rights over purchased content irrespective of the wishes of the 
copyright holder. To deter abuse, the system would preserve a record 
of the asserted fair uses in the form of an audit trail. The audit trail 
would record what uses had been made of the protected content and 
the user's stated grounds for claiming fair use protections, but would 
not record any infonnation identifying those users who had asserted 
fair use rights. Any user-identifying infonnation would be escrowed 
with a third party and revealed to the copyright holder only upon a 
showing of cause. We might label such a DRM mechanism "fair use-
fri endl y. ,,243 
Implementing such a proposal may substantially improve the abil-
ity to exercise fair use rights, which is a desirable outcome from a 
policy standpoint. Granting users the technological capability to en-
gage in fair uses of DRM-protected works would bring practical real-
ity back in line both with the existing law and with settled user 
expectations derived from long experience with fair uses of offline 
works. Improving protections for fair use in DRM would also elimi-
nate one of the strongest criticisms of the DMCA and re-ground that 
legislation in its original purpose of deterring copyright infringement. 
241 . Cf supra notes 189-91 and accompanying text. 
242. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 87-89 (1999) 
(discussing behavior-constraining force exerted by law, norms, markets, and architecture as 
distinct modalities of regulation). 
243. See Barbara Fox, Fair Use Friendly DRM? (2002), http://www.cfp2002.orglfairuse/ 
fox.pdf. 
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Empowering users to exercise their fair use rights without violating 
the DMCA might, in tum, increase law-abiding behavior244 and tem-
per the critical evaluation of the DMCA as a one-sided giveaway to 
powerful producer cartels.245 It would eliminate the anomalous situa-
tion in which private entities are effectively empowered to rescind a 
legislative grant of rights to the public at large. Finally, re-
empowering users to engage in fair uses of digital media could spark a 
storm of new creative output - valuable both for its own sake and for 
the new market opportunities it could yield - as transformative uses 
of content previously forbidden by technology would again become 
'bl 246 POSSI e. 
This would be a very different world from the one we presently 
inhabit - sufficiently different to raise nontrivial doubts whether it 
could feasibly come to exist. Because of the benefits that would be 
available to users of digital media if DRM technologies incorporated 
stronger provisions for fair use rights, it is worth exploring, at least 
tentatively, what would be required to effect such change. 
A. Social Norms 
Perhaps the single most important precondition for the adoption 
of fair use-friendly DRM is neither legal nor technological, but cul-
tural. The emergence of a public consensus that DRM should protect 
fair use, and that a technological lockdown of creative works is no 
longer acceptable, will do much to spur reform. 
Efforts to increase public awareness of the social costs imposed 
by the current legal and technological regime are already underway. 
Professor Lawrence Lessig's recent books Free Culturi47 and The 
Future of ideas,248 for example, are accessible efforts to demonstrate 
to nonspecialist audiences the shortcomings of the current system. 
Indeed, a growing body of critical literature has begun to emerge in 
recent years highlighting the harm to the public welfare caused by an 
intellectual property regime that cedes to copyright holders too much 
control over how their works are used.249 This literature, in tum, is 
244. See Ohamija & Wallenberg, supra note 73, at 17 ("ORM extension proposals ... 
may increase user compliance, because users are now able to engage in fair use without 
circumvention."). 
245. See, e.g., Richard M. Stallman, Misinterpreting Copyright -A Series of Errors, in 
FREE SOFfWARE, FREE SOCIETY: SELECTED ESSAYS OF RICHARD M. STALLMAN 77, 82-83 
(Joshua Gay ed., 2002), available at http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/fsfs/rms-essays.pdf. 
246. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: THE NATURE AND FUTURE OF CREATIVITY 
(2004). 
247.1d. 
248. LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A 
CONNECTED WORLD (200 I). 
249. See, e.g., FISHER, supra note 4; RICHARD M. STALLMAN, FREE SOFfWARE, FREE 
SOCIETY: SELECTED ESSAYS OF RICHARD M. STALLMAN (Joshua Gay ed., 2002); LiTMAN, 
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itself a current in a broader stream of scholarship that has begun to 
question (or, in some instances, to renew old questions about) the state 
of intellectual property law more generally.25o This is a time of grow-
ing academic interest in the linkages between copyright law and pol-
icy on the one hand, and individual creative liberty on the other. 
Outside the academic community, citizen groups have arisen to 
advocate copyright reform and foster greater awareness of intellectual 
property issues.251 These groups broaden the debate beyond college 
campuses, bringing new voices into the mix. In time, they may shift 
public attitudes and inspire calls for reform, including stronger protec-
tions for fair use. While these groups are now fringe players, far re-
moved from political and economic power and lacking day-to-day 
influence over policy, increases in protections for user rights will 
likely begin with them. 
The Creative Commons project offers a number of different li-
censes - essentially, contractual alternatives to copyright - that 
creative artists may adopt when issuing their content.252 Some of these 
licenses expressly permit users to engage in activities that would oth-
erwise constitute copyright infringement. Indeed, the avowed goal of 
the project is to enlarge the scope of the commons, the shared pool of 
cultural antecedents upon which future creators may draw for their 
own work. In some respects, the project is expressly about influencing 
the role that cultural norms play in shaping users' everyday interac-
tions with creative content/53 allowing users to become active partici-
pants in the back-and-forth of creative dialogue, rather than passive 
consumers of content owned by corporate media conglomerates and 
locked up with DRM. Creative Commons is an experiment and a 
work in progress. If it bears fruit, it may demonstrate that a vibrant 
process of creative production is sustainable even when the ordinary 
controls of copyright law are relaxed. 
It is not difficult to envision ways in which projects like Creative 
Commons could influence cultural norms concerning legal and tech-
nological protections for copyrighted works. If users of Creative 
supra note 4, chs. 10-13; SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, COPYRIGHTS AND COPYWRONGS: THE 
RISE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND How IT TIIREATENS CREATIVITY ch. 5 (200 I). 
250. See, e.g., ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: 
How OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND 
WHAT TO Do ABOUT IT (2004); JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS: LAW 
AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY chs. 4-{i, 13 (1996). 
251. See, e.g., Public Knowledge, http://www.publicknowledge.org (last visited Nov. 16, 
2006); Downhill Battle, http://www.downhillbattle.org (last visited Nov. 16, 2006). For 
international counterparts to these groups, see, for example, Consumers Digital Rights Cam-
paign, http://www.consumersdigitalrights.orglcms/index_en.php (last visited Nov. 16,2006) 
and Online Rights Canada, http://www.onlinerights.ca (last visited Nov. 16,2006). 
252. Creative Commons Licenses, http://creativecommons.orglaboutllicenses/meet-the-
licenses (last visited Nov. 16,2006). 
253. See Christopher M. Kelty, Punt to Culture, 77 ANTHROPOLOGICAL Q. 547, 553-54 
(2004). 
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Commons-licensed media become accustomed to being able to en-
gage in transfonnative uses of content they have purchased, for exam-
ple, they may become less tolerant of a legal and technological regime 
that denies them comparable fair use rights in traditional DRM-
protected digital media. In other words, the success of projects like 
Creative Commons could fuel consumer demand for a relaxation of 
DRM restrictions. In the face of such demand, strengthening accom-
modations for fair use in DRM would be an achievable goal that con-
tent providers could adopt. 
For consumers and citizens to demand greater protections for fair 
use, they must develop a sense of how they are hanned by the com-
parative absence of such protections under the current regime. While 
the intellectual and organizational foundations for such a shift in pub-
lic attitudes are being laid, it is too soon to know whether those foun-
dations ultimately can support enduring pro-user social nonns and 
revitalize the scope of fair use protections. Nevertheless, the work 
now underway is certain to be an indispensable part of any such evo-
lution. 
B. Markets 
The paucity of market-centric approaches for protecting end user 
rights in DRM is puzzling. To be sure, there have been proposals that 
aim to incorporate market mechanisms to solve digital copyright prob-
lems in innovative ways, such as the proposal to give content owners 
a positive stake in the spread of peer-to-peer technology by compen-
sating them for each transfer of one of their works on such services.254 
Absent, however, has been any suggestion that a business model 
could be devised that increases a copyright holder's rewards in pro-
portion to the technological protections it provides for fair use of its 
works. 
It is not intuitively clear why this should be so. The success of 
Apple Computer's comparatively pennissive iTunes Store/55 for ex-
ample, suggests that consumers will reward sellers who use less re-
strictive technologies to protect the content they sell. Offering robust 
provisions for fair use, instead of the weak ones now widely available, 
254. See, e.g., JGrgen NUtzel & RUdiger Grimm, Potato System and Signed Media For-
mat - An Alternative Approach to Online Music Business, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 3RD 
INTERNATIONAL CONF. ON WEB DELIVERING OF MUSIC 23 (2003), 
http://wwwAfriendsonly.orglpaperslNuetzel]otato _ Webdelmusic03.pdf. See generally 
Digital Media Project, Berkman Center for Internet & Society, Content and Control: Assess-
ing the Impact of Policy Choices on Potential Online Business Models in the Music and 
Film Industries (2005), http://cyber.law.harvard.edulmedialfiles/content_control.pdf (ana-
lyzing how four different business models could be applied to digital media). 
255. See supra note 61-64 and accompanying text. 
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would provide an exceptional way for a seller of digital content to 
distinguish itself from its competitors and build market share. 
The problem, however, may lie not with the technology developer 
or reseller, but with the copyright holder upstream. The recorded en-
tertainment industries are characterized by oligopolistic interdepen-
dency. Moreover, copyright holders generally hold no great 
enthusiasm for fair use. Suppliers of recorded entertainment in par-
ticular have been dragged forcibly onto the Internet, loudly protesting 
and litigating at each step of the way to preserve old revenue streams 
and business models.256 As between a system offering strong DRM 
with minimal protections for fair use, and a DRM system that protects 
fair use but which may be abused by users to infringe copyright, ex-
perience suggests that the content industries would favor the former. 
A technology reseller that offered a fair use-friendly DRM system 
might very well attract customers. But it would have little content to 
offer them. 
At present, market mechanisms may provide little incentive for 
copyright holders to embrace DRM technologies engineered for fair 
use. Whether novel business approaches can be developed to encour-
age them to do so, just as authors have begun to propose approaches 
for reconciling the content industries with peer-to-peer distribution, 
remains outside the scope of this Article, but suggests a potentially 
fruitful avenue for further legal, economic, and technological re-
search. 
C. Code 
Adopting a DRM system engineered for fair use will have impor-
tant ramifications for design of the hardware and software that pro-
vide user access to DRM-protected digital media. These ramifications, 
in tum, are likely to provoke the strongest political objections to fair 
use-friendly DRM. In my opinion, these objections are indistinguish-
able as a practical matter from objections to fair use per se, so I will 
not treat them separately in this section. The possible benefit of a pub-
lic dialogue on fair use more generally, however, will be considered in 
the next section when addressing possible legislative initiatives.257 
The most substantial and visible technological changes will in-
volve implementing a user rights assertion mechanism in code. From 
the user's view, the defining characteristic of a DRM system engi-
neered for fair use is the increased range of possible uses that are im-
plemented in its controlling hardware and software. For the reasons 
explored previously, a DRM system may be said to protect fair use 
256. See FISHER, supra note 4, ch. 3. 
257. See infra Part V.D. 
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precisely to the extent that its programming allows it to recognize and 
act upon a user's unilateral assertion of rights. 
The primary consequence of this design decision is that the media 
player component in a fair use-friendly DRM system must, at some 
point, be able to accommodate any request a user makes - even uses 
that are determined ex post to be illegal. Because the fair use doctrine 
sometimes permits duplication of an entire work, for example, the 
DRM mechanism must be technically capable of duplicating the entire 
work in response to a user's assertion of fair use rights. Similarly, it 
must be capable of extracting arbitrary subparts of the whole at the 
user's request. It need not offer these capabilities by default, but once 
the user has asserted the fair use right, the DRM system must comply. 
One alternative would be to embed the technological capability of 
unrestricted playback and duplication in every media player, and 
unlock that functionality with respect to a particular item of media 
upon the user's assertion of fair use rights. This design would satisfy 
the requirements of fair use-friendly DRM, but would obviously be 
more susceptible to circumvention: sufficiently proficient users could 
tweak the code to make unrestricted playback the default. Content 
suppliers might be forgiven for viewing such a design as, at best, 
suboptimal. 
Erickson and Mulligan suggest an alternative.258 Software players 
might be designed modularly, with capabilities that could be extended 
in response to a user's assertion of fair use rights. In their terms, upon 
a user's assertion of fair use rights, a compliant player might be de-
signed to "deliver to individuals technical capabilities not previously 
installed" in the player mechanism.259 
There is an (admittedly inexact) analogy to just this sort of modu-
larity in the design of existing media players. A wide variety of data 
compression schemes exist for the encoding of both audio and video 
content.260 It is common for personal computer media player pro-
grams, upon encountering an audio or video file that has been en-
coded with an unfamiliar compression scheme, to download from the 
Internet whatever additional software is necessary to process the 
user's request. The player program, in other words, extends its own 
capabilities to accommodate a user's request to play back encoded 
content. 
A modular player mechanism might be developed in similar fash-
ion to support fair use rights in DRM. Although a player application 
might be designed ab initio (as most commercial programs currently 
are) to limit user interactions with DRM-protected content to a range 
258. Erickson & Mulligan, supra note 102, at 995. 
259.ld. 
260. See Wikipedia, List of Codecs, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_codecs (as of 
Nov.17,2006,01:17GMT). 
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of preauthorized permissible uses, the player could be engineered to 
recognize a user's assertion of additional fair use rights, and to re-
spond accordingly by extending its own capabilities, at least tempo-
rarily. The player could be designed to self-install whatever additional 
functionality is needed to comply with the user's assertion of rights. 
The foregoing example is only one possibility, hypothesized by a 
nonspecialist, of how a mandate to strengthen protections for fair use 
in DRM technology might alter the design of computer software. I do 
not intend to suggest that the specific design described above should 
be mandated by law because legislative or regulatory "technology 
forcing" threatens perverse and unintended consequences. If the goal 
of improving protections for fair use in DRM were mandated, how-
ever, an extensible media player tool might be one of the technologies 
that could evolve to fill the need. The next subsection investigates 
how legal tools might be employed to press for such an improvement 
in fair use protections for digital media. 
D.Law 
Reinterpreting the DMCA. I previously noted that the tension be-
tween the fair use doctrine and the reality of technological restrictions 
on user rights flowed partly from restrictive judicial interpretations of 
the DMCA. Those interpretations, in my view, are not commanded by 
the statutory text and appear inconsistent with the stated legislative 
purpose behind the DMCA.261 The Supreme Court has never ap-
proved these prior judicial constructions of the statute, and the major-
ity of the circuit courts have never opined on the DMCA. Therefore it 
is possible that conditions more favorable to the protection of fair use 
in DRM could come about through future judicial interpretations of 
the DMCA more accommodating of fair use rights. 
This prospect is not merely academic. Although early judicial in-
terpretations of the DMCA tended to take a restrictive view of users' 
rights in general and fair use in particular,262 more recent decisions 
have recognized a more expansive sphere of user rights to circumvent 
DRM h ·· . 263 mec amsms In some circumstances. 
In Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. SkyUnk Technologies, Inc., a 
manufacturer of electronic remote-control garage door openers al-
261. See supra Part 11.8.3. 
262. See, e.g., Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, III F. Supp. 2d 294, 321-24 
(S.D.N.Y. 2000), ajJ'd sub nom. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d 
Cir. 2001); RealNetworks, Inc. v. Streambox, Inc., No. 2:99CY02070, 2000 WL 127311, at 
·8 (W.O. Wash. Jan. 18,2000). 
263. See, e.g., Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522, 531-
32, 546-49 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that DMCA did not empower manufacturer of laser 
printers to inhibit competition in the aftermarket for refilled toner cartridges by embedding 
an electronic "authorization mechanism" in its printers that was "circumvented" by makers 
of refi lied toner cartridges). 
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leged that a competitor had "circumvented" its proprietary code se-
quence to create a "universal" transmitter that worked with many 
other manufacturers' garage door mechanisms.264 The court rejected 
the allegation that, in so doing, the competitor had violated the 
DMCA.265 The Chamberlain court cautioned against interpreting the 
DMCA "to restrict consumers' rights" by "allow[ing] any manufac-
turer ... to add a single copyrighted sentence or software fragment to 
its product, [and] wrap the copyrighted material in a trivial 'encry~­
tion' scheme" that users would then be barred from circumventing. 66 
And in a passage that could presage much more lenient judicial con-
structions of the DMCA in the future if carried to its logical conclu-
sion, the Chamberlain court did what other courts had expressly 
refused to do: it measured the reach of the DMCA's anti-
circumvention bar based in part on its effect on other rights granted to 
users under the copyright laws: 
The DMCA ... defines circumvention as an activity 
undertaken "without the authority of the copyright 
owner." The plain language of the statute therefore 
requires a plaintiff alleging circumvention (or traf-
ficking) to prove that the defendant's access was un-
authorized - a significant burden where, as here, the 
copyright laws authorize consumers to use the copy 
of Chamberlain's software embedded in the [garage 
door openers] that they purchased?67 
Read literally, Chamberlain seems to suggest that circumvention 
of a DRM mechanism does not violate the DMCA where "the copy-
right laws authorize consumers to use the [content] that they pur-
chased" in the desired fashion. 268 It would be a small step indeed to 
conclude that circumventing DRM is not punishable when it enables 
fair use of the underlying content, and in time, evolving judicial atti-
tudes may lead courts to such a conclusion.269 
264. Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
265.ld at 1202-03. 
266.ld at 1201. 
267.1d. at 1193 (citation omitted). 
268.ld 
269. The facts of Chamberlain suggest one potentially crucial distinction. Chamberlain 
arose in the context of a dispute between a producer of durable goods and its economic 
competitor. See id at 1183. Where the DMCA is invoked as a tool to squelch economic 
competition. courts have not genemlly seen fit to intervene. See. e.g., Monotype Imaging, 
Inc. v. Bitstream, Inc., 376 F. Supp. 2d 877 (N.D. Ill. 2005); Agfa Monotype Corp. v. 
Adobe Sys., Inc., 404 F. Supp. 2d 1030 (N.D. Ill. 2005). On the other hand, in cases closer 
to copyright's heartland, courts might well give the DMCA a broader reading in the interest 
of protecting creative media works such as music, films, or software. See. e.g., Davidson & 
Assocs. v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630, 64~2 (8th Cir. 2005). 
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Such an evolution is on display in Storage Technology Corp. v. 
Custom Hardware Engineering & Consulting. Inc., in which the same 
court, drawing upon Chamberlain, again rejected a DMCA claim in 
the durable goods context.270 There, an outside service and repair firm 
performed maintenance work on a tape data storage library manufac-
tured by plaintiff Storage Technology Corporation ("StorageTek"). As 
part of its maintenance work, defendant Custom Hardware Engineer-
ing ("CHE") employed two devices to intercept copyrighted mainte-
nance and diagnostic codes built into StorageTek's products. The 
court first rejected StorageTek's argument that CHE infringed its 
copyrights in the code, reasoning that CHE inherited the statutory au-
thority of StorageTek's customers to copy the code for purposes of 
maintenance and repair.271 Then, in a passage with potentially far-
reaching implications, the court reasoned that the failure of Stora-
geTek's copyright claim ipso Jacto doomed any claim under the 
DMCA: 
To the extent that CHE's activities do not constitute 
copyright infringement or facilitate copyright in-
fringement, StorageTek is foreclosed from maintain-
ing an action under the DMCA. That result follows 
because the DMCA must be read in the context of 
the Copyright Act, which balances the rights of the 
copyright owner against the public's interest in hav-
ing appropriate access to the work. Therefore, courts 
generally have found a violation of the DMCA only 
when the alleged access was intertwined with a right 
protected by the Copyright Act. To the extent that 
StorageTek's rights under copyright law are not at 
risk, the DMCA does not create a new source of li-
ability.272 
Continued evolution in the same direction may, in time, lead 
courts to a position that is more hospitable to fair use. Were courts to 
hold that users may circumvent DRM mechanisms for the purpose of 
making fair use of a protected work without incurring liability under 
the DMCA, it would, as a practical matter, enlarge the sphere of pos-
sible fair uses that could occur without the danger of such liability. 
Nevertheless, it probably is not sufficient to rely on changing ju-
dicial attitudes to redress the imbalance that presently exists between 
the extent of fair use permitted by law and the extent that DRM tech-
270. Storage Tech. Corp. v. Custom Hardware Eng'g & Consulting, Inc., 421 F.3d 1307 
(Fed. Cir. 2005). 
271.1d. at 1311-15 (citing 17 U.S.c. § 117(c)(2000». 
272./d. at 1318 (citations omitted). 
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nology makes practicable. Easing the threat of DMCA liability bene-
fits that subset of users who possess the technological proficiency 
necessary to circumvent DRM mechanisms. Other users, however, 
must content themselves with the limitations of the DRM or else seek 
out devices to assist in circumvention - a burden that some users will 
no doubt conclude is not worth the trouble even if circumvention 
would be lawful in that instance.273 
Regulatory Responses. I raise this possibility principally to draw 
attention to its conspicuous absence from the terms of the debate. 
Thus far, Congress has declined to grant any regulatory agency the 
authority to define fair uses of copyrighted works or to regulate the 
technologies of access control.274 One can envision regulatory struc-
tures that would promote broader protections than presently exist for 
fair use in DRM, but the practical foundations for such structures do 
not yet exist. 
Legislative Responses. Legislation is presently the most promis-
ing avenue toward strengthening protections for fair use of DRM-
protected content. To date, Congress has taken little notice of the ef-
fects of emerging DRM technologies on fair use. Although Congress 
disclaimed any intent to circumscribe the fair use doctrine when it 
enacted anti-circumvention protections for DRM technologies,275 it 
has so far acquiesced in judicial interpretations of the DMCA that 
effectively constrain fair use. 
What actions might Congress take to improve the protection for 
fair uses of DRM-protected digital works? One possibility would be 
to mandate or prohibit the use of specific types of DRM technologies 
by fiat, although I have previously suggested that this may be an unat-
273. Even this latter possibility, of course, presupposes the availability of circumvention 
devices, a prospect that may be far from assured given the risk that developers of such de· 
vices may be held secondarily liable if their device is ultimately used, or publicly claimed to 
be potentially useful, to infringe copyrights. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. 
Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005). The risk that a device developer may be held secondar-
ily liable for its users' infringing acts is no doubt a disincentive to the creation of circum-
vention devices. Cj Fox & LaMacchia, supra note 95, at 63. 
274. The closest that Congress appears to have come is a provision in the DMCA that au-
thorizes the Librarian of Congress, in consultation with the Register of Copyrights, to prom-
ulgate exceptions to the broad statutory ban on circumventing technological protection 
measures. 17 U.S.c. § I 201 (a)(I)(C}-(D) (2000). The Library's use of this authority to date, 
however, has been cautious - indeed, some would say, overcautious - and has not placed 
the Library of Congress at the heart of digital media regulation in the same way that other 
federal agencies dominate the creation and enforcement of substantive law within their 
various domains. For an argument that the Library's statutory powers have thus far been 
ineffective to protect fair use against encroachment from the DMCA's anti-circumvention 
provisions, see Woodrow Neil Hartzog, Falling on Deaf Ears: Is the "Fail-Safe" Triennial 
Exemption Provision in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act Effective in Protecting Fair 
Use?, 12 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 309, 314 (2005). Absent a clearer delegation from Congress, it 
is unclear whether any agency presently enjoys regulatory jurisdiction over digital media 
and related technologies. See, e.g., supra note 66. 
275. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(c)(\) (2000). 
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tractive option. Amending the DMCA to permit DRM circumvention 
for the purpose of making noninfringing uses of the underlying con-
tent is another possibility,276 although from the perspective of the 
would-be fair user, this alternative probably includes insufficient ex 
ante assurance of nonliability.277 More durable change, however, 
might be achieved by establishing goals or objectives that would in-
duce, rather than command, the adoption of particular technologies 
protective of fair use. Currently, copyright holders probably have few 
incentives to include protections for fair use in DRM technologies; 
however, legislative action could supply adequate incentives to en-
courage the inclusion of such protections. 
Congress has many tools available to induce the development of 
DRM technologies protective of fair use. For example, it could condi-
tion some of the rights and privileges available to copyright holders 
on their deployment of adequate tools for the protection of fair use. 
The Berne Convention would presumably prohibit Congress from 
conditioning copyrightability on the presence of adequate fair use pro-
tections in any DRM system deployed to protect the work,278 but the 
enforceability of a copyright on a DRM-protected digital work in 
United States courts could be made contingent upon the presence of 
adequate protections for fair use in the DRM mechanism.279 Congress 
also could condition enforceability of the DMCA's anti-
circumvention provision on the presence of adequate technological 
protections for fair use in any DRM mechanism that controls access to 
the underlying copyrighted work.28o 
Congress might also look to the European Union Copyright Di-
rective ("EUCD") as a source of analogous authority for strengthening 
protections for fair use. Article 6(4) of the EUCD imposes a duty on 
copyright holders not to make noninfringing access to their works 
impossible: 
276. Such a proposed amendment is currently before the House Subcommittee on Com-
merce. Trade and Consumer Protection. See H.R. 1201, 109th Congo § 5(b)(I) (2005). This 
is also the approach taken in the most recent Canadian proposal on the enactment of statu-
tory protections for DRM technologies. See Department of Canadian Heritage, Copyright 
Policy Branch, Government Statement on Proposals for Copyright Reform - Frequently 
Asked Questions (July 5, 2005), http://pch.gc.calprogs/ac-calprogs/pda-cpb/reform/ 
fa'L e.cfm ("[T]he circumvention of a [technological measure] applied to copyrighted mate-
rial will only be illegal if it is carried out with the objective of infringing copyright.") 
277. Cf LESSIG, supra note 246, at 187-88 (arguing that overly protective copyright 
rules, which are removed from the original conceptions of copyright, stifle creative expres-
sion). 
278. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, 
25 U.S.T. 1341,828 U.N.T.S. 221 (in original form), 1161 L.N.T.S. 3 (as revised 1971 and 
1979). Article 5(2) of the Berne Convention provides, in relevant part, that "[t]he enjoyment 
and exercise of [a copyright holder's exclusive] rights shall not be subject to any formality." 
279. See Burk & Cohen, supra note 104, at 65. The authors' proposal analogizes from the 
present requirement of United States law that requires registration of a copyrighted work as 
a precondition to bringing suit for infringement. See 17 U.S.c. § 411 (a) (2000). 
280. Burk & Cohen, supra note 104, at 66. 
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[I]n the absence of voluntary measures taken by 
rights holders, including agreements between 
rightholders and other parties concerned, Member 
States shall take appropriate measures to ensure that 
rightholders make available to the beneficiary of [a 
copyright] exception or limitation ... the means of 
benefiting from that exception or limitation, to the 
extent necessary to benefit from that exception or 
limitations and where the beneficiary has legal ac-
cess to the protected work ... concerned.2SI 
This provision, if read literally, comes close to enacting what Profes-
sor Lessig labels "copy-duty," the flip side of copyright - "the duty 
of owners of protected property to make that property accessible.,,2s2 
This is a novel approach to reconciling the historical rights of users to 
engage in fair uses of copyrighted works with the increased powers of 
technological control DRM makes available to copyright holders. As 
one commentator observed, the EUCD "is certainly the first time in 
European copyright law that authors have been asked to facilitate the 
exercise of exceptions to their own rights.,,283 
There may, however, be less here than meets the eye. The 
EUCD's stated preference for voluntary action (including agreements) 
may leave copyright holders with room essentially to contract around 
the protections the Directive is meant to supply, subject to whatever 
further constraints individual EU member nations may mandate. The 
Directive provides little guidance to individual EU nations on the par-
ticular steps they might take if rightholders are not believed to be pro-
viding adequate protections, or indeed on how to ascertain whether 
such protections are adequate or not. 284 Furthermore, Article 6(4) of 
the EUCD does not insist that every copyright exception remain tech-
nologically available, but only a subset consisting of seven particular 
exceptions that are cross-referenced in the Directive. The exceptions 
that must remain available to users of DRM-protected works include 
some that would be recognized as similar to fair use under American 
law, such as the exception in Article 5(3)(a) of the EUCD for uses 
"for teaching or scientific research.,,2s5 But others that American law 
would also consider to involve fair use, such as news reporting or par-
281. Council Directive 2001/29/EC, art. 6(4), 200 I OJ. (L 167) 10, 17-18 [hereinafter 
EUCDj. 
282. LESSIG, supra note 242, at 127; see also Digital Rights and Wrongs, ECONOMIST, 
July 17, 1999, at 76 (describing copy.duty as "the legal obligation of copyright holders to 
provide public access" to their works). 
283. Dusollier, supra note 102, at 52. 
284. See id. at 53. 
285. EUCD, supra note 281, art. 5(3)(a), 20010.1. (L 167) at 16. 
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ody, are omitted.286 The EUCD does not oblige copyright holders to 
guarantee public access to their works for these purposes.287 
Because of these weaknesses, the EUCD is perhaps more useful 
as a template or model than as a specific guide for legislative action in 
the United States. In an innovative feature, the EUCD enlists copy-
right holders as participants in the process of preserving fair use. 
Bringing all the interested parties into the process in this fashion is not 
only practical, but politically shrewd. While increasing the likelihood 
that whatever technological measure ultimately adopted will be effec-
tive, such an inclusive approach also diminishes the resistance that 
would undoubtedly follow if copyright holders believed that change 
were being imposed upon them without their participation. 
This is not to say that any legislative action in this arena would 
not stir controversy. Copyright holders probably find the legislative 
status quo quite satisfactory precisely because it permits them to adopt 
DRM mechanisms that, in practice, restrict users' ability to use con-
tent in ways unsatisfactory to copyright holders, irrespective of fair 
use rights. Copyright holders may be expected to greet legislative at-
tempts to increase technological protections for fair use with skepti-
cIsm. 
At bottom, however, resistance to consumers' ability to exercise 
fair use rights is indistinguishable from resistance to fair use itself. 
There can be no reasoned justification for a legal regime that reduces 
the fair use section of the Copyright Act to a paper tiger. If United 
States public policy is to change such that users may not engage in 
what were previously considered to be fair uses of copyrighted works, 
candor and the due process principle of notice demand that Congress 
say so openly, rather than allowing the DMCA's anti-circumvention 
provision to tacitly swallow the fair use statute as more and more 
copyrighted works are issued in DRM-protected form. The public 
debate over the proper balance of interests in copyright law that would 
flow from an initiative to strengthen technological protections for fair 
use would itself be welcome.288 
286. See Dusollier, supra note 102, at 53. 
287. For a discussion of a number of lingering issues in the interpretation of the EUCD 
and in the parallel enabling legislation of many EU member nations, see Urs Gasser & Mi-
chael Girsberger, Transposing the Copyright Directive: Legal Protection of Technological 
Measures in EU-Member States: A Genie Stuck in the BOllle?, Berkman Publication Series 
No. 2004-10, at 10-11, 17-24 (Nov. 2004), http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/medialfiles/ 
eucd.pdf. 
288. See FISHER, supra note 4, at 119 (lamenting that questionable court decisions in 
peer-to-peer file-sharing cases short-circuited the useful democratic debate that would have 
resulted from leaving the issues for resolution by Congress); see also LESSIG, supra note 
246, at 199-207 (advocating the necessity of a public, democratic reaction to the specter of 
the criminalization of massive numbers of American copyright violators). 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
IfDRM, in one form or another, is truly here to stay, there is a vi-
tal public interest at stake in the form that DRM ultimately takes. Dif-
fering DRM designs strike differing balances between the protections 
conferred on users and content providers; the choice of which balance 
is the "right" one has far-reaching ramifications for both parties. The 
issue merits discussion. So far, however, the discussion has been a 
monologue. Only the voices of copyright holders have perceptibly 
influenced the design and implementation of DRM technologies and 
legal protections against circumvention. The technologies that have 
resulted, perhaps unsurprisingly, reflect not a balancing of interests, 
but the interests of large content producers alone. 
The more technology reflects only one set of interests, however, 
the more it departs from the law, which conceptualizes copyright as a 
balancing of interests, with the ultimate goal of fostering both creative 
expression and broad public availability of creative works. The result 
has been a perverse scenario nowhere commanded by the Copyright 
Act or the DMCA, in which technological measures have been al-
lowed to override the fair use doctrine. The daily experience of users 
departs from existing law, and the public has never been offered any 
explanation why fair use should mean something different (and far 
less) in the digital domain than in the offline world. As a result, users 
have responded by attempting to use copyrighted digital works in the 
manner they always have, and chafing at the technological limitations 
that prevent them from doing so. 
This situation is neither desirable nor stable. Neither, however, is 
it inevitable. If a DRM mechanism is engineered to protect the proc-
ess by which users exercise their fair use rights, their experiences will 
more closely approach what they are accustomed to in the offline 
world. Such a system would permit users to assert their statutory 
rights to engage in fair uses of DRM-protected works, subject to the 
deterrence of abuse through an (initially anonymous) audit trail. By 
recognizing and accommodating the rights of parties on both sides of 
the fair use equation, such an implementation might well be the first 
system of "digital rights management" truly worthy of the name. 
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